This is BIG.
According to at least one Supreme Court case, the “right of association” can even trump National Security interests. In other words, if the U.S. Supreme Court is called upon to balance the “right of association” against governmental interests in National Security, the private “right of association” can win. The “right of association” can be more important than National Security. I find that to be astonishing.
In fact, there are elements of the research presented in the balance of this article that I find sometimes breathtaking and sometimes weird. There appears to be power in the “right of association” unlike anything I’ve previously seen. And this “right of association,” incidentally, is a “judicial construct” that’s been “found” (created) by the Supreme Court even though it does not expressly exist within the text of the Constitution.
In order to understand the extraordinary power of the “right of association,” I believe you should start with Article 1 Section 10 Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States which declares in part, “No State shall . . . make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.”
Note that the “States” to which this prohibition applies are the original States of the Union. I read Article 1.10.1 to mean that the States of the Union cannot lawfully collect taxes, impose fines or pay their bills in any currency other than gold or silver dollars or at least paper dollars that are redeemable in gold or silver coin.
Note that the Article 1.10.1 prohibition against any currency that’s not gold or silver applies only to the States of the Union. The federal government is not included in that prohibition and has always been free to use whatever it wanted as as a currency.
In A.D. 1933, the federal government removed gold coins from domestic circulation. Circa A.D. 1964, the feds stopped coining silver coins. Circa A.D. 1968, the feds stopped redeeming silver certificates (paper money) with silver dollars. Thus, by the end of A.D. 1968, there were no gold or silver coins in domestic circulation, nor were there any paper dollars that might still be redeemed in gold or silver.
I believe that the removal of gold and silver dollars from our national economy caused the States of the Union (which could only function with gold or silver dollars) to become insolvent and inoperable. I believe that in order to fill the resulting “void” (see the Senator Harkin’s Letter on this blog), an alternative set of fictional or territorial “states” were established (perhaps at 28 USC 81-131) that were not States of the Union and were therefore not subject to Article 1.10.1 of the Constitution of the United States. I believe these alternative “states” (like “STATE OF TEXAS” or “TX”) were intended for the primary purpose of allowing us to transact our business affairs with legal tender issued by the Federal Reserve rather than gold or silver coins minted by the U.S. Mint and thereby evade the prohibition at Article 1.10.1.
Each State of the Union is typically referred to as “The State”. Each of the territorial and/or fictional “states” (that became predominant since the gold and silver were removed) are typically referred (in the gov-co’s own law) as “this state”.
The “The State”/“this state” distinction is not absolute. There are times (especially in government documents written before A.D. 1933) when the courts and legislators used the term “this state” to refer to The State. However, in modern governmental documents, the term “this state” seems to almost always refer to the territorial/fictional “states” created to fill the void the States of the Union were rendered insolvent by the loss of gold and silver coin from circulation.
The nature of “this state” is still obscure. I have previously described “this state” as “territorial and/or fictional” precisely because I don’t know exactly what “this state” is. Senator Tom Harkin has reportedly described “this state” as an “implied charitable trust”. I only know what “this state” is not: it’s not “The State”; “this state” is not a member-State of the perpetual Union styled “The United States of America”.
What follows is a lengthy, but powerful list of 71 Supreme Court cases (provided by Findlaw.com) that deal with the phrase “right of association”. According to Findlaw, this list includes every instance where the Court used the phrase “right of association”. This list is ordered from the earliest instance of “right of association” (A.D. 1941—just eight years after the onset of the New Deal) to the most recent in this 21st century in order to show how the meaning of the term clarified, evolved or modified over time.
I believe that study of the Supreme Court’s use of “right to association” ultimately indicates what may be the true nature of “this state”: an “association”. If I’m right, this may explain the astonishing power and near-invulnerability that seem attached to the “right of association”. I.e., the power of the “right of association” must be maintained by the Court because this “right” is the foundation for “this state”. The “right of association” can’t be challenged or impaired without threatening the very existence of “this state”. That’s why the Supreme Court seems so determined to protect this “right” against virtually all challenges.
The following excerpts from the 71 Supreme Court are presented with my highlighting in various colors and my “first-impression, shoot-from-the-hip” comments [in bold, blue bracketed text]. My initial comments may be contradicted by my later comments. The difference, if any, reflects my own growing “understanding” as I read thru the list of cases. Later this week, I’ll follow up with another article based on the varying definitions of “right to association” as found in the various editions of Black’s Law Dictionary.
Again, this is BIG. Take the time to read the entire article.
71. FindLaw: PHELPS DODGE CORP. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BD., 313 U.S. 177 (1941)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/313/177.html
… scholars. n1 Because of [313 U.S. 177, 184] the Pullman strike, Congress in the Erdman Act of 1898 prohibited inroads upon the workingman’s right of association by discriminatory practices at the point of hiring. 2 Kindred legislation has been put on the statute books of more than half the states. 3 …
[Note that the first time the “right of association” reached the USSC was A.D. 1941—150 years after adoption of the 1st Amendment but only 8 years after the onset of the New Deal and national democracy in A.D. 1933. I doubt that this is coincidence.
I’ll bet that the right of association has gained significance only in the context of the national democracy. If so, the democracy and “this state” are probably based on the “right of association” that allows Americans to “associate”.
But the “right to associate” necessarily implicates a “right to NOT associate”—that’s why “this state” is VOLUNTARY rather than mandatory. That’s why “this state” has power, but no authority. And that power only applies to those who “voluntarily” “assent” to “associate” with “this state”. The State is not based on the facts or presumptions of a day-to-day, transaction-by-transaction. The State is based on a voluntary AGREEMENT of some sort that is either 1) fundamentally different from the “association” of “this state”; or 2) an alternative “association” that is mutually exclusive from that of The State.
This needs work, but my gut tells me that the key to “this state” will be found in a solid grasp of the “right of association”.]
70. FindLaw: HILL v. STATE OF FLA. EX REL. WATSON, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/325/538.html
… Act to say that it aimed to equalize bargaining power between industrial employees and their employers by putting federal law behind the employees’ right of association. The whole plan or scheme of the Wagner Act was to enable employees to bargain on a fair basis, freed from ‘restraint or coercion [325 U.S. 538, ...
69. FindLaw: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR V. AMERICAN SASH AND DOOR CO. , 335 U.S. 538 (1949)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/335/538.html
.. to the critical exercise of a reasoned judgment.' Laski, Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 575, 581 (1948). The right of association, like any other right carried to its extreme, encounters limiting principles. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 , 531, ...
68. FindLaw: COMMUNICATIONS ASSN. v. DOUDS, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/339/382.html
... Management Relations Act, 1947. 1 Wrapped up [339 U.S. 382, 417] in this problem are two great concerns of our democratic society – the right of association for economic and social betterment and the right of association for political purposes. It is too late in the day to deny to Congress the power to …
[This faintly suggests that any “association” for “economic or social betterment” probably implicates the democracy of “this state”. On the other hand, the right of association for “political purposes” might open the door to choose between The State and “this state”.]
… 382, 417] in this problem are two great concerns of our democratic society – the right of association for economic and social betterment and the right of association for political purposes. It is too late in the day to deny to Congress the power to promote industrial peace in all the far-flung range of interstate …
67. FindLaw: WIEMAN v. UPDEGRAFF, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/344/183.html
… to require such an oath, on pain of a teacher’s loss of his position in case of refusal to take the oath, penalizes a teacher for exercising a right of association peculiarly characteristic of our people. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 Am. Hist. Rev. 1 (1944), reprinted in …
[The “right of association” probably lays the foundation for “this state” and its “implied charitable trust”. The purported “state governments” are probably just “associations” of private individuals acting as if they were a de jure government when they are more likely to be de facto associations which rely on the voluntary “association” of other private persons.
Shee-oot! The right of “association” probably lays at the foundation of the de facto officer doctrine. When I’m stopped by a traffic cop and I say “What seems to be problem, OFFICER?” I’ve probably “associated” myself with the municipal employee by “recognizing” him as an “officer” and probably MY “officer”. Recognition = association?]
66. FindLaw: N. A. A. C. P. v. ALABAMA, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/357/449.html
… effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner’s members of their constitutionally protected right of association. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, at 400; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 . Such a “. . . subordinating interest of the …
65. FindLaw: LATHROP v. DONOHUE, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/367/820.html
… of causes with which he disagrees, from which he obtains no gain, and which is not part and parcel of service owing litigants or courts. The right of association is an important incident of First Amendment rights. The right to belong – or not to [367 U.S. 820, 882] belong – is deep in the American …
[EXACTLY! We have the right to “belong” or NOT to “belong” (voluntarily enter or reject) to any association—including the implied charitable trust of “this state”.
But what does the word “belong” mean? Does “belong” mean “property of”?
And “belonging” is not necessarily a simple fact like Yes or No. “Belonging” may also imply CAPACITY. For example, I might belong to The State as a “beneficiary” but not belong as a “fiduciary”. Likewise, I could “belong” to “this state” in the capacity of a FIDUCIARY but not as a beneficiary. And I could also simultaneously belong to “The State” as a beneficiary/creditor and belong to “this state” as a fiduciary/debtor.
Similarly, officers of The State might belong to The State as fiduciaries while they simultaneously belonged to “this state” as beneficiaries.
Makes me laugh. We’re cracking the secrets of their system. We’re breaking the bastards. We’re getting closer every day.
Praise the LORD.
You hear me?
PRAISE the LORD.]
64. FindLaw: GIBSON v. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE COMM., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/372/539.html
… People, of which petitioner here was president at the time it was under investigation by the Florida committee. In my view the constitutional right of association includes the privilege of any person to associate with Communists or anti-Communists, Socialists or anti-Socialists, or, for that matter, with people …
… compel answers to questions which abridge that right. Accordingly, I would reverse here on the ground that there has been a direct abridgment of the right of association of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and its members. But, since the Court assumes for purposes of this case that there …
… Amendment into the Fourteenth had only recently been adumbrated (see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 ) and the full exposition of the right of association that is part of the periphery of the [372 U.S. 539, 569] First Amendment had not yet been made. Indeed Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 …
[The first sentence seems too convoluted to be accidental. I suspect they’re hiding something in that confusion.]
… schools and to put their children in parochial schools, rested in part on the property interest of the parochial schools. Id., pp. 534-535. The right of association has become a part of the bundle of rights protected by the First Amendment (see, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama, supra), and the need for a pervasive right …
[Ooohh, I think I get it. The 1st Amendment expressly guarantees “the right of the people to peaceably to assemble”. I’ll bet that the “right of association” (first seen at the USSC in AD. 1941) is something entirely different and intended for the “persons” of “this state”. I.e., the “right of association” might be intended as “this state’s” “mirror-image” for “persons” of The State’s original declaration of a right of “assembly” for the People.
All of this suggests that even the word “association” may be hazardous to our health. It may be that even a claim to have an “association” within The State might be contradictory or confusing.
Implications: 1) I need to conduct a similar Findlaw search for the term “right of assembly”; 2) I may need to frame claims of my place within The State with the language of “assembly” rather than association; 3) the express charitable trust of The State might be an “assembly” rather than an “association,”; and 4) acting “at arm’s length” implicitly denies participating in ANY “association”!
Damn. I laugh. And I praise.]
… Association’s annual convention. Second, petitioner protested that production of the membership records would violate “a legal right of ours, the right of association.” At the same time the petitioner expressed willingness to testify from recollection as to the membership or nonmembership in the local branch of any …
63. FindLaw: APTHEKER v. SECRETARY OF STATE, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/378/500.html
… give rise to punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for this free society. Freedom of movement is kin to the right of assembly and to the right of association. These rights may not be abridged, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 -462, only illegal conduct being …
[The court apparently recognizes the “right of assembly” and the “right of association” to be two separate and distinct rights. That being so, why would these “rights” be different if they both flowed from the 1st Amendment? The answer is probably that one right is for the people and/or The State while the other “right” is for the “persons” of “this state”.
But what does the court mean by “punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for this free society”? What “free society” are they talking about about—The State or this state? Almost certainly, they mean “this state”.
At first, it seems incongruous that we would “pay” any “price” for a “free society”. Given that this case is A.D. 1964 (when they stopped coining silver coins) it is arguable that we couldn’t “pay” for anything from that time forward. Does that mean we couldn’t pay for “this free society” with lawful money because there was none? Or does it mean that in “this free society,” everything is “free” since there is no gold/silver coin and nothing is truly paid for. Is that what “this state” truly is? A “free society” because nothing is actually paid for?
Note also that the “price we pay for this free society” is to allow our mere “conduct” (rather than crimes) to be “punishable”. Crimes require INTENT. Crimes can only be committed by a living man (one of the people). But “conduct” is a consequence of mere action—without regard to intent. Thus, “conduct” can be attributed to a “person,” a corporation, a legal fiction. A person/corporation/legal fiction can be “punished” for conduct, but a man can only be punished (not just sued) for a crime based on his intent.
I also suspect that “this free society” is synonymous with “this state”.
Finally, whatever “this free society” is, it’s got to be an “association” of individuals, persons, whatever. If you “associate” with “this free society” you are probably presumed to “belong” to that “association”.
Every “society” must be an “association”. Again, if you act at arm’s length, you’re not acting as (engaging in conduct) as a member of any association/society.
Is that the difference between The State and “this state”? Could it be that The State of the Union is not an “association”? That everyone within The State is presumed to act “at arm’s length” rather than in relation to others?? That’s a stretch, and probably not precisely accurate, but I’ll bet it’s roughly correct or at least pointing towards a more accurate insight.
And note the reference to “freedom of movement”: How does that relate to the right to travel or some other right associated with driving an automobile. Can driving without a license be justified if the driving is for the purpose of exercising the “right of peaceable assembly” or perhaps even the “right of association”?]
… of the Fourth Amendment. This freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful – knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking. Once the right to …
[Damn. What th’ heck am I into? This is getting weirder and weirder.
“Freedom of movement” is the “very essence” of “our free society”??
I’m not even sure of what “our free society” is, but I’m astonished to learn that its “very essence” is “freedom of movement”. Before today, I would not have guessed, dreamed or imagined that the “essence” of any society would be “freedom of movement”.
For example, if I had to guess, I’d say that the “very essence” of the several States (or “societies” or whatever) created by the Declaration of Independence was recognition of God-given, unalienable Rights (sovereignty) for all men and the correlative duty imposed on governments to secure those rights. That’s an essential purpose that’s noble, inspiring and hard not to see or imagine.
But what kind of “free society” finds its “very essence” in a mere “freedom of movement”?
And next, what kind of “movement” are we talking about? Movement of what? Men, persons, commercial goods? Movement where? Within The State? In “this state”? Are we talking about interstate (or even global) commerce which clearly depends on the movement of goods. Is that what “this free society” is all about: the movement of goods in commerce??
And if that’s not crazy enough, this alleged “right of movement” makes “meaningful” (gives definition to?) all other rights including the rights of “knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking”???!!!
This is so damned fantastic, I’m not even sure what I’m reading. Did the USSC really declare that “This freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful - knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking”? Or is that statement merely some litigant’s argument that’s being quoted in the context of the case?
It can’t be a litigant’s argument. It’s too crazy to come from anyone but the Supremes.
And note that this “essential” freedom of movement “sets us apart”. Presumably, the “us” is “our free society”. I’m guessing that “our free society” is code for “this state,” the national democracy and/or some other alternative to the several States of the Union. If so, the “freedom of movement” is “essential” to separate “this state” from The State.
At first glance, it seems most likely that this “freedom of movement” describes the physical movement of men, persons or goods in interstate commerce. But it is also remotely possible that this “freedom of movement” may be the freedom to “move” from a actual place on the soil within the boundaries of The State into some fictional or territorial plane of existence called “this state”. If so, the “freedom of movement” is the freedom to “move” from the real plane of existence on the soil within The State into the fictional or territorial plane of existence “in this state” as an act of intellectual choice, imagination or even delusion—but without actual, physical change.
If that assessment sounds crazy to you, I guarantee that it sounds crazy to me, too. But what else can be made of the court’s statement that’s not equally fantastic?]
62. FindLaw: GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/381/479.html
… more than the “right of assembly” – a right that extends to all irrespective of their race or ideology. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 . The right of “association,” like the right of belief (Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 ), is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to …
[OMG. The court implies that while the “right of association” extends to “all,” the “right of assembly” may only extend to a particular RACE of IDEOLOGY (read, “FAITH”?). It’s too soon to suppose that speculation is correct. Odds are, I’m wrong. But maybe not. Maybe the “right of assembly” is reserved to a particular race (white) and a particular ideology (Christianity). The 1st Amendment is first and foremost about religious freedom. Therefore, it may not be such a stretch to suppose that the controlling “ideology” of the “right of assembly” might be Christianity.
Also, note that the “rights of association” is admittedly MORE than the “right of assembly”. How did this “right of association” come to exceed the “right of assembly”? Did We the People amend the Constitution to increase the “right of association”? We did not. Thus, whatever “more” was added to the “right of association” had to be added by the courts or legislatures—and probably those of “this state”.
This is simply another indication that the “right of assembly” is not truly of The State but must be an attribute of the national democracy and/or “this state”.]
… give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 -522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers …
[If the “right of association” is a “right of privacy,” then it may follow that that such right is a “private” right that can only be implemented in “private law” or perhaps “private international law” of “this state”.
The “penumbra” of the First Amendment might be code for “this state”. I.e., “this state” might exist in the “penumbra” of the Constitution, but not within the Constitution itself.
At minimum, the “right of association” appears to exist in the “penumbra”.]
… of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the First Amendment, made applicable to the States [of the Union] by the Fourteenth, some of the latter group involving the right of association which this Court has held to be a part of the rights of speech, press and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. As for Aptheker v. Secretary of …
[Hmph. The “right of association” is not simply a derivative or “mirror-image” of the “right of assembly” but also derived from the other rights of “speech” and “press”—and perhaps some other rights as well (like freedom of religion) which might implicate a race or “ideology”.
More, the “right of association” has been “held” (defined) by “this court”. That means the “right of association” is something created by the Supreme COURT rather than Congress or some state legislatures.]
61. FindLaw: OSBORN v. UNITED STATES, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/385/323.html
… penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one . . . . The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers `in any …
60. FindLaw: THORPE v. HOUSING AUTHORITY, 386 U.S. 670 (1967)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/386/670.html
… a `privilege’ or `bounty,’ its denial may not infringe speech.” No more can a tenant in a public housing project be evicted for the exercise of her right of association, a right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. …
59. FindLaw: WARDEN v. HAYDEN, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/387/294.html
… of the press.” The First Amendment also has a penumbra, for while it protects only “speech” and “press” it also protects related rights such as the right of association. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 , 462; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 ; …
58. FindLaw: UNITED STATES v. ROBEL, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/389/258.html
… then certified to this Court as a direct appeal. Held: Section 5 (a) (1) (D) is invalid since by its overbreadth it unconstitutionally abridges the right of association protected by the First Amendment. Pp. 262-268.
(a) The indiscriminate application of 5 (a) (1) (D) to all types of association with …
… 384 U.S. 937 . 4 We affirm the judgment of the District Court, but on the ground that 5 (a) (1) (D) is an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association protected by the First Amendment. 5 [389 U.S. 258, 262] We cannot agree with the District Court that 5 (a) (1) (D) can be saved from …
… Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). But the operative fact upon which the job disability depends is the exercise of an individual’s right of association, which is protected by the provisions of the First Amendment. 7 Wherever one would place the right to travel on a scale of constitutional values, …
[Here we see the “right to travel” somehow linked (perhaps only by implication) with the “essential” right of “movement”.]
… is not insubstantial. But it cannot be doubted that the means chosen to implement that governmental purpose in this instance cut deeply into the right of association. Section 5 (a) (1) (D) put appellee to the choice of surrendering [389 U.S. 258, 265] his organizational affiliation, regardless of whether …
[There is a hint here that one of the very few “lines” that the gov-co can’t cross is the “right of association” (the “very essence” of which may be “freedom of movement”). If so, and if exercising that particular right does not necessarily place us in “this state,” then a claim to be exercising our “right of association” might serve as a pretty good defense in most confrontations with “this state”. I.e., a governmental purpose (policy?) that “cut deeply into freedom of movement” might be challenged or even defeated.]
… to consider the other constitutional arguments. [ Footnote 6 ] 18 U.S.C. 2385. [ Footnote 7 ] Our decisions leave little doubt that the right of association is specifically protected by the First Amendment. E. g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, supra, at 507; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation …
[“Little doubt” is not “no doubt”. Thus, the court’s express language implies that it is still possible that the “right of association” is NOT “specifically protected” by the First Amendment. That would be consistent with previous case excerpts that seem to indicate that the “right of association” is not directly derived from the First Amendment but is found it its “penumbra” and was probably created by the USSC, itself.]
… with this view, I dissent. The constitutional right found to override the public interest in national security defined by Congress is the right of association, here the right of appellee Robel to remain a member of the Communist Party after being notified of its adjudication as a Communist-action …
[SOB! This is only a dissent, but it seems to declare that the “right of association” can override the “public interest in NATIONAL SECURITY”. SOB! If that’s so, then the “right of association” can override Homeland Security. Damn! That makes a proper understanding of “right of association” critical to defending against “this state”.]
… Communist Party after being notified of its adjudication as a Communist-action organization. Nothing in the Constitution requires this result. The right of association is not mentioned in the Constitution. It is a judicial construct appended to the First Amendment rights to speak freely, to assemble, and [389 U.S. 258, 283] to petition for redress of grievances. 1 While the right of association has deep roots in history and is supported by the inescapable necessity for group action in a republic as large and complex as ours, it has only …
[Exactly what I’d guessed: the right of association is a “judicial construct” by the USSC and/or SCUS—it might be derived from the First Amendment, but it is not actually found there. But if the “right of association” is “construed” from the first Amendment rights of free speech, assembly and petition, note what First Amendment rights are not mentioned as part of the foundation for the “right of association”: the establishment and free exercise of RELIGION and freedom of press. Implication: the “right of association” may be an atheistic right in that it may not implicate our freedom of religion. This would be consistent with previous speculation concerning “this state” as a plane of existence that does not admit the existence of the God of the Bible.
The court’s statement, “the right of association has deep roots in history and is supported by the inescapable necessity for group action in a republic as large and complex as ours,” raises some interesting questions and observations:
First, “deep roots in history” is not “deep roots in the Constitution of the United States”. “Deep roots in history” are not necessarily “deep roots” in American history. History tends to be international and tends to run back further than A.D. 1776. This suggests that the “deep roots” for the “right of association” could be international in nature, or even primitive if they trace back the natural associations that Locke attributed to mankind when if first began to create societies.
Second, the “right of association” is traced back to the “inescapable necessity for group action” is also distant from the Constitution. I suspect that the Court is implicitly describing the “inescapable necessity” of group action to create “this state” when The several States were rendered insolvent an largely inoperable by the feds removing gold (A.D. 1933) and then silver (A.D. 1968) from circulation. Once the gold and silver disappeared, under Article 1.10.1 of the federal Constitution, the States of the Union could not longer operate. This void would create an “inescapable necessity” to create some alternative “states” to keep public order etc. but were not directly subject to the Constitution.
Third, what, exactly, is the “republic as large and complex as ours”? Is that “The United States of America,” or “United States of America,” or “United States,” or even the “United Nations”?]
… contours as yet lack delineation. Although official interference with First Amendment rights has drawn close scrutiny, it is now apparent that the right of association is not absolute and is subject to significant regulation by the State. The law of criminal conspiracy restricts the purposes for which men may …
[Good LORD, first they tell us that the “right of association” trumps National Security. Then they tell us that “right of association” is subject to regulation by “the State”—at least when the “law of criminal conspiracy” is involved.
And what “State”? The State of the Union or “this state”?
Weirder and weirder.
But in the midst of this weirdness we might be witnessing the Court’s attempt to make sense and empower the irrational and powerless.]
… both federal and state, as are political parties and corporations. The relevant cases uniformly reveal the necessity for accommodating the right of association and the public interest. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), which contained the first substantial discussion of the right in an opinion of …
[The “right of association” is clearly a function of private choice and probably under private law, and so far, revealed by the USSC to be a “personal” right of each individual. The “public interest,” on the other hand, is a collective concept and justification for most of whatever “this state” is doing.
From A.D. 1941 (the first “right of association” case at the USSC) until this case (A.D. 1967), the “right of association” may have been predominant. This A.D. 1967 case, however, indicates that the court is rethinking and redefining the individual’s “right of association” to at least “accommodate” (and perhaps become subservient to) the “public interest”.]
… effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner’s members of their constitutionally protected right of association.” 357 U.S., at 463 . The same path to decision is evident in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Button, 371 …
… they may speak in groups as well. If they may assemble and petition, they must have the right to associate to some extent. In this sense the right of association simply extends constitutional protection to First Amendment rights when exercised with others rather than by an individual alone. In NAACP v. …
[Yep. The “right of association” is a COLLECTIVE right rather than a right of an “individual alone”. This suggests that the “right of association” may be a necessary attribute of the national democracy created by the New Deal. If so, the “right of assembly” would be right of sovereigns to assemble as individual men each acting at arm’s length but not as (or into) a COLLECTIVE.]
57. FindLaw: DuBOIS CLUBS v. CLARK, 389 U.S. 309 (1967)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/389/309.html
… assembly, petition, and expression. Those rights merely enforce, protect, or sanction the beliefs or ideology to which one is committed. So does the right of association which we have said over and again to be part and parcel of those First Amendment rights. Basic in this scheme of values is the immunity of beliefs, …
[Could it be that “beliefs” include religious beliefs, while “ideology” is necessary atheistic? Is “democracy” an ideology?
Blacks 4th has no definition of “ideology”. Black’s 8th does not define “ideology” but doe define “ideological aggression” as “1. See hostile propaganda under PROPAGANDA. 2. See subversive propaganda under PROPAGANDA.”
Thus, at least one definition for “ideology” is “propaganda”.
Black’s 8th has a fairly long definition for “propaganda” that begins, “Int’l law. 1. The systematic dissemination of doctrine, rumor, or selected information to promote or injure a particular doctrine, view of cause. . . .”
I’m fascinated to see that “propaganda” (and thus “ideology”) appears to be associated with “Int’l law”. That’s not so far removed from previous speculation about “private international law” as the area for “right of association”. ]
56. FindLaw: WILLIAMS v. RHODES, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/393/23.html
… here. III. The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, lies at the root of these cases. The right of association is one form of “orderly group activity” (NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 ), protected by the First Amendment. The right “to engage in …
… for any school of thought they may choose, whatever part of the spectrum it reflects. Cumbersome election machinery can effectively suffocate the right of association, the promotion of political ideas and programs of political action, and the right to vote. The totality of Ohio’s requirements has those effects. It …
… now in existence. The concurring opinions cite a series of decisions protecting what has been termed the First [393 U.S. 23, 57] Amendment right of association. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. …
… effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner’s members of their constitutionally protected right of association. . . .
. . . . .
“. . . The exclusive purpose [of the state authorities] was to determine whether petitioner was conducting …
[The apostrophe in the phrase “petitioner’s members” indicates that the “petitioner” is a singular entity. But, interestingly, this singular “petitioner” has several “members” (plural). Thus, this “petitioner” is some sort of collective or corporate entity—but not a singular, living man who is acting “alone” and in his sovereign capacity.]
55. FindLaw: SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/394/618.html
… n. 17. 2 As we made clear in Guest, it is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. 3 Like the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 , it is a virtually unconditional personal right, 4 guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.
[Again, evidence that the “right of association” is 1) “virtually unconditional”; but also 2) a “personal” (rather than unalienable?) right.]
54. FindLaw: BAIRD v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, 401 U.S. 1 (1971)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/401/1.html
… security as freedom of conscience.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). The protection of the First Amendment also extends to the right of association. As we said in Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968):
“The First Amendment’s ban against Congress `abridging’ freedom of speech, the …
53. FindLaw: LAW STUDENTS RESEARCH COUNCIL v. WADMOND, 401 U.S. 154 (1971)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/401/154.html
… speech free from government control, even speech which is dangerous and unpopular. And included within the protection of the First Amendment is the right of association; the right to join organizations which themselves advocate ideas. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, …
52. FindLaw: GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/401/437.html
… [401 U.S. 437, 466] bedrock of free speech as well as religion. The implied First Amendment right of “conscience” is certainly as high as the “right of association” which we recognized in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 , and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 . Some indeed have thought it higher. 3 …
51. FindLaw: LIPPITT v. CIPOLLONE , 404 U.S. 1032 (1972)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/404/1032.html
… oral argument. * In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 39-40, 89 S.Ct. at 15, I said.
‘Cumbersome election machinery can effectively suffocate the right of association, the promotion of political ideas and programs of political action, and the right to vote. The totality of Ohio’s requirements has those effects. It …
50. FindLaw: DOE v. BOLTON, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/410/179.html
… There is nothing specific in the Bill of Rights that covers that item. Nor is there anything in the Bill of Rights that in terms protects the right of association or the privacy in one’s association. Yet we found those rights in the periphery of the First Amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 . …
49. FindLaw: U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE v. MORENO, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/413/528.html
… 528, 543] could not say that this “unrelated” person provision has no “rational” relation to control of fraud. We deal here, however, with the right of association, protected by the First Amendment. People who are desperately poor but unrelated come together and join hands with the aim better to combat the …
… Report, 4 the definition of household was “designed to prohibit food stamp assistance to communal `families’ of unrelated individuals.” The right of association, the right to invite the stranger into one’s home is too basic in our constitutional regime to deal with roughshod. If there are abuses inherent in …
[Again, the Supremes offer evidence that the right of association necessarily implies the existence of some collective and/or association to others. Apparently, the “right of association” cannot be exercised without creating an “association” of some sort that has an existence that is separate from that of its members/associates.
The “association” that results from exercising the judge-made “right of association” is probably a legal fiction and therefore something other than a man made in God’s image and endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable Rights.
So, what happens if I, the living man with the proper name of “Alfred Adask” voluntarily assume the role of fiduciary (or even surety) for the legal fiction/account/estate named “ALFRED ADASK”? Does that trust relationship qualify as an “association”? Is the resulting “association” only recognized “in this state”? By creating or participating in such “association” do I effectively waive my standing to claim my God-given, unalienable Rights?]
48. FindLaw: KUSPER v. PONTIKES, 414 U.S. 51 (1973)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/414/51.html
… suffer from strained and artificial applications of this kind. The mere fact that a state statute lightly brushes upon the right to vote and the right of association, important as these are, should not automatically result in invalidation. Prior case law does not require a conclusion of invalidity where, as here, …
47. FindLaw: LUBIN v. PANISH, 415 U.S. 709 (1974)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/415/709.html
… in the penumbra of First Amendment rights. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN stated in Storer v. Brown, post, at 756, “The right to vote derives from the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment, protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Dissenting opinion.) MR. JUSTICE …
[Shee-oot! The “right of association” gave rise to a “right to vote”? But the “right of association” is a judicial construct that was apparently “found” about A.D. 1941. If this “right of association” predates A.D. 1941, but is itself enforceable against the States only by means of the 14th Amendment, then the “right of association” could not have existed prior to A.D. 1868. And, even if we trace the “right of association” to the 1st Amendment, that right could not have existed prior to adoption of the Bill of Rights in A.D. 1791.
But the body of the Constitution of the United States was adopted in A.D. 1789—two years before the 1st Amendment—and the body of that Constitution is full of references to the People’s right to vote for presidents, senators and representatives. Thus, there was a “right to vote” in the body of the Constitution before the adoption or “finding” of any “right of association”. Therefore, the “right to vote” that this court traces to the “right of association” must be a right to a “vote” that is fundamentally different from the “right to vote” found in the body of the Constitution.
All of this suggests that the “right to vote” that’s traceable to the “right of association” is the right to vote in the national democracy created by the New Deal and/or “in this state”—but not the right to vote within The State or under any organic constitution.
Conversely, if you are registered to vote under the right of association, you must be “associated” with “this state” and/or the national democracy. To vote in “modern” elections is to give evidence of one’s membership/participation in the national association of the New Deal/national democracy/this state.]
46. FindLaw: STORER v. BROWN, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/415/724.html
… and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” The right to vote derives from the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment, protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 …
[The “qualified voters” are probably those who are registered “in this state”.]
45. FindLaw: VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE v. BORAAS, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/416/1.html
… U.S. 12 . It involves no “fundamental” right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting, Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U.S. 663 ; the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 ; the right of access to the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 ; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold …
… because Belle Terre residents may entertain whomever they choose. Only last Term MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS indicated in concurrence that he saw the right of association protected by the First Amendment as involving far more than the right to entertain visitors. He found that right infringed by a restriction on food …
44. FindLaw: COUSINS v. WIGODA, 419 U.S. 477 (1975)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/419/477.html
… of the injunction issued by the Illinois Circuit Court in this case was as direct and [419 U.S. 477, 492] severe an infringement of the right of association as can be conceived. Beside it, the sort of “subtle governmental interference” which was referred to in Bates v. Little Rock, supra, pales. We would …
[This case might illustrate how to use a claim of denial of the “right of association” to stop even court injunctions and possible court orders.]
43. FindLaw: HILL v. STONE, 421 U.S. 289 (1975)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/421/289.html
… 9, the Court held that the time limitation on registration did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the First and Fourteenth Amendment right of association. By contrast, the Texas scheme imposes a restriction on the franchise having no perceptible purpose or effect in preserving the integrity of the …
42. FindLaw: BUCKLEY v. VALEO, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/424/1.html
… conduct of campaigns for political office.” The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and …
… contributor’s freedom of political association. [424 U.S. 1, 25] The Court’s decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a “basic constitutional freedom,” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S., at 57 , that is “closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like …
41. FindLaw: GREER v. SPOCK, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/424/828.html
… Warren observed in invalidating a portion of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 as an unconstitutional abridgment of the First Amendment right of association:
“[T]his concept of `national defense’ cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a …
[It appears that even “subversion” and “national defense” cannot withstand a properly-drawn attack under the guise of a denial of “freedom of association”. I’ll bet that treason is similarly immune from charges if defended with claims of “denial of freedom of association”.
The power of the “freedom of association” seems so enormous and so irresistible that I am all but convinced that that it must lie at the heart of the creation of “this state”. This “freedom of association” must be the ultimate line of defense for those who have engaged in the sedition, subversion and treason of creating “this state” and attempting to overthrow “The State”.
The nice implication is that, if the “right of association” is the primary line of defense for every treasonous whore in the modern government, they don’t dare deny that same right if claimed by the “great unwashed”. I’m still suspicious that the “right of association” may only exist “in this state” so it shouldn’t be invoked without awareness of possible political implications. Nevertheless, if you were “trapped” “in this state,” it might do you no further harm and might provide a great deal of relief to make defense based on your “freedom of association”.]
40. FindLaw: RUNYON v. McCRARY, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/427/160.html
… is foreseeable; Thirteenth Amendment limitations on Congress’ power to ban “badges and incidents of slavery” may be discovered; the doctrine of the right to association may be bent to cover a given situation. In any event, courts will be called upon to balance sensitive policy considerations against each other – …
[The right of association appears to be 1) a “doctrine”; and 2) a “policy”. Both terms seem non-constitutional and private in nature. Both terms at least implicate “this state” rather than The State.]
39. FindLaw: MOORE v. EAST CLEVELAND, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/431/494.html
… rejected this contention, and held that the ordinance at issue “involve[d] no `fundamental’ right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as . . . the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 ; . . . or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 …
… invasion, such as the freedoms of speech, press, and religion, and the freedom from cruel and unusual punishments. Other interests, for example, the right of association, the right to vote, and various [431 U.S. 494, 549] claims sometimes referred to under the general rubric of the right to privacy, also weigh …
38. FindLaw: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/448/555.html
… that expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others. [ Footnote 16 ] See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of association): Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy); Estelle v. Williams, …
37. FindLaw: CITIZENS AGAINST RENT CONTROL v. BERKELEY, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/454/290.html
… ballot measure, which interests outweighed the First Amendment interests infringed upon. Held: The restraint imposed by the ordinance on the right of association and in turn on individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment. Pp. 294-300.
(a) To place a limit on individuals wishing to band together to advance their …
[A “collective” right clearly implicates the democracy rather than the unalienable Rights of each man under the republican form of government.
The term “individual” is probably characteristic of “this state” rather than The State (where we find “people” and “men”).
What would the court’s reaction be to any attempt to “place a limit on MEN wishing to band together”? I’ll bet that “banding” by MEN might have to take place under the constitutional “right of assembly” rather than the doctrinal “right of association”.
Even so, you can probably defend almost anything you do if your conduct is under the guise of the “right of association” as exercised by a newly-created, private “association”—especially when that association is for political purposes. Conversely, you might be most vulnerable if you stand alone (that is, without any private “association”) and are deemed to be a member of the “association” loosely described as “this state”.]
… to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing no limit on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , held that contributions to candidates or their committees could be restricted in order to prevent corruption or …
[Hmph. Whatever limits can be placed relative to the “right of association” must be placed equally on all “individuals” (probably members of “this state”), but not on particular associations. The “associations” have almost unlimited rights; the limits are placed on the “individuals”.]
… to advocate individual views on a ballot measure. It is only when contributions are made in concert with one or more others in the exercise of the right of association that they are restricted by 602. There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with …
… wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association. Section 602 does not seek to mute the voice of one individual, and it cannot be allowed to hobble the collective expressions of a group. Buckley …
[The defense of the “collective” is persistently implied and is consistent with a national democracy (which is a collectivist form of government).
Under the “republican form of government” expressly guaranteed at Art. 4.4 of the Constitution of the United States and 1.2 of The Constitution of The State of Texas, the people are sovereign as individual men and women. Under the national democracy, the people are sovereign as a collective, but not as individual men and women. In the republican form of government, the people hold virtually all of the rights as individual men and women. In the democracy, the “individual” members have virtually no intrinsic rights and are constantly subject to any whim of the collective.]
… can outlaw anonymous contributions. IV A limit on contributions in this setting need not be analyzed exclusively in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two rights overlap and blend; to limit the right of association places an impressible restraint on the right of expression. The restraint imposed by the Berkeley ordinance on rights of association and in turn individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for …
[OK—then the ideas not merely expressed but published on my (or any other blog, website or book) are exercises of both the “right of expression” (as opposed to the “Freedom of Speech”?) and the “right of association” (as opposed to the right of peaceable assembly?). By publishing, I am probably presumed to have created an “association” between myself and my readers. The “right of association” is probably so crucial to shielding current governmental officials from charges of sedition and treason that the courts will not allow that “right” to be disturbed—even if it means allowing the “great unwashed” to occasionally escape the system’s jurisdiction.
I know from personal experience that the FDA and Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS) are attempting to prosecute “individuals” who market products based on “health claims” made on websites. I have been personally sued by the FDA/TDSHS for $25,000 per day, $750,000 per month, $9+ million per year by the Attorney General of Texas based on my relationship to a website that made health food claims. It took me about 1.5 years to run the AG off, primarily by recognizing the real meaning of the “drug” and “medical device” laws (see my “man or other animals” articles on my blog at http://adask.wordpress.com).
But I am beginning to see that I might have run the AG off a lot quicker if I’d also based my defense on a “right of association” based on the “association” between the health food seller and his customers. This strategy would have to be carefully considered. I’ll bet that the “right of association” attaches only to “individuals” who are members of “this state” and the national democracy. To claim a “right of association,” you may implicitly waive your standing as a sovereign man made in God’s image and endowed by your Creator with certain unalienable Rights. The “man or other animals” defense is absolutely based on each man’s sovereign capacity. I doubt that an “individual” could make the “man or other animals” defense.
Therefore, if I’d tried to make both a “man or other animals” defense and a “right of association” defense, one defense might’ve cancelled the other and I might probably have waived my claim of standing as a sovereign. Or maybe not.
Obviously, the “right of association” is still somewhat confusing, but the potential power is, so far, unmistakable. The “right of association” may not be the sharpest knife in the drawer, but it’s probably pretty close.]
36. FindLaw: CITY OF MESQUITE v. ALADDIN’S CASTLE, INC., 455 U.S. 283 (1982)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/455/283.html
… if “the challenged ordinance had a rational basis . . . we would nevertheless be compelled to strike it down” as an infringement of the fundamental right of association. 630 F.2d, at 1041. No less than 29 federal cases were cited for this conclusion. No Texas case was cited. Id., at 1041-1044. [ Footnote * ] …
[The term “fundamental right” has appeared repeatedly. The “fundamental” rights are clearly not “unalienable” (God-given) rights.
We might reasonably ask “fundamental” to what? “Fundamental” to my standing as an individual? “Fundamental” to the existence of “this state” and the national democracy? “Fundamental” to WHAT?
Answer that question and you might have a pretty good guide as to which “rights” to avoid and which to claim. If you want to be subject to the “republican form of government” of The State but not the “national democracy” of “this state,” you’d best not be claiming any “rights” that are deemed “fundamental” to “this state”.]
35. FindLaw: BROWN v. HARTLAGE, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/456/45.html
… to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some element of association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without trenching on any right of association protected by the First Amendment. The fact that such an agreement necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying …
[An association for illegal purposes is probably a conspiracy. Is it possible that modern “conspiracy” laws are based on violation of the “right of association”? If so, modern “conspiracies” probably take place only “in this state”. Without reading the modern conspiracy laws, I nevertheless speculate that those lows might be vulnerable to challenge if they were based on the “right of association”. I.e., what happens if a defendant denies the existence of an association and/or denies that any association took place “in this state” and/or claims that all alleged criminal conduct took place on the soil, within the boundaries of The State?]
34. FindLaw: RODRIGUEZ v. POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 457 U.S. 1 (1982)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/457/1.html
… an interim appointment of the Governor or some other elected official, Puerto Rico’s party appointment mechanism impermissibly infringes upon their right of association under the First Amendment and denies them equal protection of the laws. A It is not disputed that the fundamental protections of the United …
33. FindLaw: NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/458/886.html
… to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the …
[The text reads like commentary from a dissent. It’s taken out of context and confusing and should be downloaded in its entirety and studied. The text seems to say that the modern “right of acting for himself” (pro se??) is, in fact, a exercise in the “right of association” whereby one combines his exertions with others. If that were true, would it follow that a modern trial is an “association”??
The court’s reference to “inalienable” should not be confused with “unalienable” (God-given). Nor should “personal liberty” be confused with the “Blessings of Liberty” found in the Preamble to the federal Constitution. Your rights are either “unalienable” or they are not. No rights are “almost as unalienable” as others. To be “unalienable” is to be absolute. Unalienable rights are not relative in power or validity. They either are or they are not.]
32. FindLaw: FEC v. NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, 459 U.S. 197 (1982)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/459/197.html
… on our statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976):
“The Court’s decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a `basic constitutional freedom,‘ Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S., at 57 , that is `closely allied to freedom of speech and a right [459 ...
31. FindLaw: CARPENTERS v. SCOTT, 463 U.S. 825 (1983)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/463/825.html
... or affected by the conspiracy. The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in holding that 1985(3) prohibits wholly private conspiracies to abridge the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Because of that holding the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether respondents' action could ...
[Here’s another one that should be downloaded and read to clearly understand its meaning. This existence of “wholly private” conspiracies suggests the existence of “partly public” (or some such) conspiracies.
The USSC seems about to conclude that “wholly private conspiracies” do not “abridge the right of association”. That conclusion might be consistent with, even necessary to, the notion that “this state” is a “wholly private conspiracy” and thus not subject to challenge or prosecution as a criminal violation of the “right of association”. In other words, if “this state” was based on a “wholly private conspiracy,” the participants might not be immune from criminal liability under the “right of association”. Conversely, if we could allege and prove that “this state” was based in part on a “partly public” conspiracy (whatever that is), the participants might be subject to prosecution.
Or maybe not. It’s confusing. Needs more study.]
30. FindLaw: HISHON v. KING & SPALDING, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/467/69.html
… contends that for these reasons application of Title VII to the decision whether to admit petitioner to the firm implicates the constitutional right to association. But here it is alleged that respondent as an employer is obligated by contract to consider petitioner for partnership on equal terms without regard …
[Ah-hah. It may be possible for each of us to limit our exposure to the “association” of “this state” and/or the national democracy by means of devising contracts wherein we agree to not enter into “association” with “this state” and/or the national democracy. Perhaps the presumptions of “association” with “this state” cannot overcome the constitutional kryptonite of “obligations of contracts”.]
… petitioner for partnership on equal terms without regard to sex. I agree that enforcement of this obligation, voluntarily assumed, would impair no right of association. 4 [467 U.S. 69, 81] In admission decisions made by law firms, it is now widely recognized – as it should be – that in fact neither race nor …
… 60 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 815, 844-860 (1980). Impediments to the exercise of one’s right to choose one’s associates can violate the right of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 …
[We apparently have an nearly absolute right to choose our “associates”. Members of law firms are “associates” or “partners”. That distinction should be studied. The State Bar of Texas is probably a private association which “chooses” who to admit or reject for membership under the “right of association”.
There is a suggest here that “associations” are clearly something other than “corporations”. There is a big question in my mind as to whether an “association” is a legal fiction (like a corporation) or something “actual” and entirely different from a legal fiction.
The distinctions between “associations,” “legal fictions,” “trusts,” “corporations,” and even “states” should be closely studied.
There’s also a hint here that if you or I were to start an “association” (“Adask & Associates”?) that we might enjoy some practical advantages (especially if our “association” were declared to exist on the soil within “The State”) that were not available to corporations or trusts.]
… to laws that prevent discrimination, much depends upon the standards by which the courts examine private decisions that are an exercise of the right of association. For example, the Courts of Appeals generally have acknowledged that respect for academic freedom requires some deference to the judgment of schools …
29. FindLaw: ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/468/609.html
… challenges to the Minnesota statute. With respect to Part II-A of the Court’s opinion, I agree with the Court that the Jaycees cannot claim a right of association deriving from this Court’s cases concerning “marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.” Paul v. …
[The court cannot be implying that the only recognized and protected associations are "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." We’ve already seen rights of association applied to employment, lawfirms, etc. the court must be simply saying that the Jaycees, in this matter, made an improper argument.]
… of activities undeserving of constitutional shelter and underprotective of important First Amendment concerns. The Court declares that the Jaycees’ right of association depends on the organization’s making a “substantial” showing that the admission of unwelcome members “will change the message communicated by the …
[This suggests that the “right of association” is intimately linked to the rights of speech or even press, and that a fundamental “object” of any viable “association” may be the “message” that association intends to “communicate”. This suggests that if you were going to create an “association,” one of your key tasks would be to craft some fundamental “message” that you wished to communicate. Likewise, an existing association might be successfully attacked based on the argument that they had engaged in conduct outside or contradictory to the “messeage” they were created to “communicate”.
But “communicate” to who? To association members? Or to the purported government, or some other special interest?]
… test, under which the Court weighs the interests of the State of Minnesota in ending gender discrimination against the Jaycees’ First Amendment right of association. The Court entirely neglects to establish at the threshold that the Jaycees is an association whose activities or purposes should engage the strong …
… by the membership, is a not insubstantial part of what it does. . . . [A] good deal of what the [Jaycees] does indisputably comes within the right of association . . . in pursuance of the specific ends of speech, writing, belief, and assembly for redress of grievances.” Id., at 1570. There is no reason to …
[Aww-right! There’s an “indisputable” purpose on which a valid association can be based: “redress of grievances”. Likewise, there’s a“message” that a valid “association” can “communicate”: “redress of grievances”.
This suggests that any organization (even corporations and trusts) that was created for the express purpose of “redress of grievances” to Congress or even state legislatures would enjoy some substantial protections from gov-co interference.
I won’t say that an organization for the purpose of “redress of grievances” is bullet proof, but I suspect that it may be highly “bullet-resistant”.]
28. FindLaw: UNITED STATES v. ABEL, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/469/45.html
Reversed. Footnotes [ Footnote 1 ] 707 F.2d 1013 (1983). [ Footnote 2 ] In Scales and Brandenburg we discussed the First Amendment right of association as it bore on the right of persons freely to associate in political groups, short of participating in unlawful activity. See 395 U.S., at 449 ; …
27. FindLaw: TASHJIAN v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CONNECTICUT, 479 U.S. 208 (1986)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/479/208.html
… applied to the Republican Party rule permitting unaffiliated voters to participate in certain Republican Party primaries, the statute abridges the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id., at 1241. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 9-431 “substantially interferes with the Republican …
[Apparently, you can be “affiliated” or “unaffiliated” with a particular organization and especially an “association”. “Affiliated” and “unaffiliated” are thus important words.
What if I expressly declared myself to be “unaffiliated” with “this state” or the national democracy?
The thrust of this case appears to be to allow people who are “unaffiliated” with a particular association (say, the Republican Party or perhaps “this state”?) to nevertheless voluntarily “participate” in the “association”. The object of this voluntary participation would seemingly be to entice the “unaffiliated” to take some step sufficient to “affiliate” with the association.
All of this implies that there may be a “grey area” wherein one might “participate” in an association (like “this state”) without actually “affiliating” as a member of “this state”. But I’ll bet money that if you “participate” in the association of “this state,” you will be presumed to have affiliated with “this state” unless you expressly declare to the contrary.
IF this conjecture were valid, it faintly suggests that it might be possible to open bank accounts, take credit cards and driver licenses of “this state” and still minimize being exposed to the jurisdiction of “this state” if you expressly denied having “voluntarily affiliated” with “this state” or perhaps deny having “voluntarily affiliated” with “this state” except in direct reference to the specific bank account, ]
… Party’s attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of association. As we have said, the freedom to join together in furtherance of common political beliefs “necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people …
[“Freedom to identify the people . . .”?
Man, I need to read the balance of that statement. We are talking about “identification,” folks. The statement implies that “identification” is a means of determining which “association” you may be “affiliated” with. Thus, the “right of association” gives us the “freedom to join together in furtherance of common political beliefs” and that “joining” presupposes the “freedom to identify” identify the people who are members of the particular “association”. This chain of “logic” probably expresses the rationale behind every cop’s demand “see some identification”. When the cop asks for an ID, he is probably asking if you “identify” (affiliate) with “this state”.
In this case, the USSC implies that the whole identification hassle may be ultimately based on the “right of association”.
Do you have a drivers license? Then that “identification” certifies that you are an affiliated member of “this state”. Your “identification documents” identify you with a particular “association”.
The “common political beliefs” of “this state” are probably something like “we can discharge our debts with legal tender rather than pay them with gold and silver coin” or “democracy is better than the republican form of government”. The “common political beliefs” of The State are probably found in the Declaration of Independence” and/or the preambles to our State and federal constitutions and/or the guarantee of the “republican form of government”.
So what happens when the cop asks for an ID and you don’t produce one? He will presume that you are affiliated/identified with “this state” and subject to its rules and regulations and give you a ticket or even jail you. But what if he asks for an ID, and you produce one that indicates that you are affiliated/identified with the association called The United States of America or The States of Texas and that the political purpose of your association is to 1) restore gold and silver coin to circulation (as per Art. 1.10.1); 2) enforce the guarantee at Art. 4.4 of a republican form of government; and 3) to enforce government’s duty to secure to each man, woman and child, the God-given, unalienable Rights declared in the Declaration of Independence? What if you declare your political purpose and that of your association to be identical to that of the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States?
In other words, what if you identify with an “association” other than “this state”? What power does the police employee have over you if you are not associated/affiliated/identified with “this state”?
I am convinced that, if the ID document can be probably drafted and recognized by “this state,” the answer is NONE.]
26. FindLaw: BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT’L v. ROTARY CLUB, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/481/537.html
… 458 U.S. 886, 907 -909, 932-933 (1982). For this reason, “[i]mpediments to the exercise of one’s right to choose one’s associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment . . . .” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 , n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. …
… serves the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (right of association may be limited by state regulations necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like …
[Apparently, “this state” can regulate the indivdual’s right of association based on this state’s “compelling interests”—EXCEPT when such regulation would serve to SUPPRESS IDEAS.
If so, then virtually any association whose principle business was the expression, clarification and publication of IDEAS would be almost totally immune from regulation by “this state”. The only exception might be if the ideas being expressed encouraged criminal activity of violence. But even then, if the association merely advocated some criminal or violent ideas—but didn’t actually commit any criminal or violent act—the association might be allowed to stand rather than “suppress” its ideas under the guise of regulating the association.
But bear in mind that just because an association might be protected regulation under “right of association” for making dangerous statements, that association might still be attacked by gov-co under some other grounds (conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or some such). The question is: Could an association that only advocated “ideas” be successfully defended under the “right to associate” against any other form of attack?
Recognizing that the “power to tax is the power to destroy,” all taxation is arguably an attack. Could it be argued that an association (like a radio show or a blog or some such) whose only purpose was to promote ideas might not be subject to taxation? Wouldn’t taxation applied to such associations necessarily reduce and suppress that organization’s ability to advocate “ideas”? I.e., the money paid into taxes would diminish or suppress the association’s ability to advocate its ideas.
Do Political Action Committees pay any taxes? I don’t think they do. If so, that exemption is probably based on the PAC’s function as an “association” for the promotion of particular political ideas. The PACs might be exempt from taxation under the “right of association”.
But, bear in mind that a tax-free status for an association that advocated ideas might be compromised if that same association also engaged in commercial activity. If that association only sold information, it might not be taxable. If it profited from the sale of information, the profits might be taxable. If it sold products other than information, the income on those tangible products would probably be taxable.
The idea that the advocacy of ideas is sacrosanct under the “right of association” might be supported by government’s response to the “Aztlan” movement in southwestern United States. The Aztlan movement is populated by Mexicans who believe that California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, etc. rightfully belong to Mexico and should be reclaimed by Mexicans who are immigrating into the southwest. I am infuriated by government’s apparent indifference to Aztlan movement. By allowing the Aztlan movement to continue to propagate ideas that are seditious and treasonous, gov-co implicitly empowers Aztlan. I.e., when people see that the Aztlan movement has been “allowed” to continue for years without government objection, people tend to believe that the Aztlan movement must be sufficiently powerful to intimidate the mighty U.S. gov-co. But perhaps the only reason that Aztlan has been tolerated so far is that it does nothing more than advocate an idea under the “right of association”.
If so, maybe we could also advocate some similarly radical ideas like “all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” and “That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among Men.” We might describe our association as “sovereignty” movement and name it “The United States of America”. Watcha think? Could such bizarre ideas ever take hold?]
25. FindLaw: LYNG v. AUTOMOBILE WORKERS, 485 U.S. 360 (1988)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/485/360.html
.. at all. Cf. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 . The Constitution does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of the right of association or to minimize any resulting economic hardship. Pp. 364-368.
(b) The statute does not abridge appellees’ right to express themselves about …
… exerts pressure on them to abandon their union. Strikers and their union would be much better off if food stamps were available, but the strikers’ right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that [private?] right. “We have held in several contexts [including the First ...
... 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983). Exercising the right to strike inevitably risks economic hardship, but we are not inclined to hold that the right of association requires the Government to minimize that result by qualifying the striker for food stamps. In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 ...
24. FindLaw: EU v. SAN FRANCISCO DEMOCRATIC COMM., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/489/214.html
... wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association." Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981). Because the ban burdens appellees' rights ...
23. FindLaw: DALLAS v. STANGLIN, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/490/19.html
... that it violated the First Amendment associational rights of minors. Held:
1. The ordinance does not infringe on the First Amendment right of association. Respondent's patrons, who may number as many as 1,000 per night, are not engaged in a form of "intimate association." Nor do the opportunities of ...
[“Association” takes place in degrees of “intimacy”?]
… . . . may be achieved in ways that are less intrusive on minors’ freedom to associate,” id., at 169. The Court of Appeals stated that “[a] child’s right of association may not be abridged simply on the premise that he `might’ associate with those who would persuade him into bad habits,” and that “neither the …
[Even children have a “right of association”?!]
… interferes with associational rights of such patrons guaranteed by the First Amendment. While the First Amendment does not in terms protect a “right of association,” our cases have recognized that it embraces [490 U.S. 19, 24] such a right in certain circumstances. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, …
… not be striking in order to survive rational-basis scrutiny. We hold that the Dallas ordinance does not infringe on any constitutionally protected right of association, and that a rational relationship exists between the age restriction for Class E dance halls and the city’s interest in promoting the welfare of …
… Fourteenth Amendment. For that reason, I believe the critical issue in this case involves substantive due process rather than the First Amendment right of association. Nonetheless, I agree with the Court that the city has adequately justified the ordinance’s modest impairment of the liberty of teenagers. Indeed, I …
22. FindLaw: MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA, ___ U.S. ___ (1996)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/517/186.html
… out, and we think it no more likely that these will either. With respect to the second argument, we wholeheartedly agree with appellees that the right of association of members of a political party “is a basic constitutional freedom” and that “governmental action that may have the effect of curtailing freedom to …
… ___ (1996) , 44] Given the past history of discrimination that gave rise to the preclearance remedy imposed by 5, the minimal burden on the right of association implicated in this case is unquestionably justified. [ Footnote 39 ] Relying on statements in appellees’ brief, rather than anything in the …
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/518/604.html
… 290, 296 (1981) (“To place a . . . limit . . . on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views . . . is clearly a restraint on the right of association“). And if an individual cannot be subject to such limits, neither can political associations be limited in their ability to give as a means of …
20. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/525/182.html
… petitions. Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, supra, at 758 (holding that time limits on enrollment in political parties did not violate the right of association because individuals were not prohibited from enrolling in parties). Moreover, as the Chief Justice illustrates in his dissent, this …
19. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/527/41.html
… v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111 (1969). Its impact on the social contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment “right of association” that our cases have recognized. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U. S. 19, 23-25 (1989). On the other hand, as the United States …
18. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/530/567.html
… by substantial state interests. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: California’s blanket primary violates a political party’s First Amendment right of association. Pp. 4-19. (a) States play a major role in structuring and monitoring the primary election process, but the processes by which political …
… choice, greater participation, increased “privacy,” and a sense of “fairness“–all without severely burdening a political party’s First Amendment right of association. * * * Respondents’ legitimate state interests and petitioners’ First Amendment rights are not inherently incompatible. To the extent …
17. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/530/640.html
… 468 U. S., at 626 . In Duarte , we said:
“[I]mpediments to the exercise of one’s right to choose one’s associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment. In this case, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any …
… which an organization that truly aims to foster a belief at odds with the purposes of a State’s antidiscrimination laws will have a First Amendment right to association that precludes forced compliance with those laws. But that right is not a freedom to discriminate at will, nor is it a right to maintain an …
[Damn. You can rely on the right of association to blunt “this state’s” antidiscrimination laws if you are part of an organization that “truly aims to foster a belief at odds with the purposes of a State’s antidiscrimination laws”.]
… Scouts of America , 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983) (challenge to BSA’s denial of membership to homosexuals; rejecting BSA’s claimed right of association), overruled on other grounds, 17 Cal. 4th 670, 952 P. 2d 218 (1998).
Footnote 10 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976) …
16. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/532/223.html
… that “inmates have a First Amendment right to assist other inmates with their legal claims.” 195 F. 3d 1121, 1124 (1999). Murphy enjoyed this right of association, the court concluded, because he was providing legal advice that potentially was relevant to Tracy’s defense. The Court of Appeals then applied our …
15. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/533/431.html
… Rights of Political Parties, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 197, 315, n. 50 (1977), that view has been subject to debate, see, e.g. , Gottlieb, Fleshing Out the Right of Association, 49 Albany L. Rev. 825, 826, 836-837 (1985); see generally Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes, 101 Colum. L. Rev 274 (2001). There is …
14. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/539/126.html
… bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether respondents have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. This Court accords substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a …
… serves the legitimate goal of deterring drug and alcohol use within prison. Second, respondents have alternative means of exercising their asserted right of association with those prohibited from visiting. They can send messages through those who are permitted to visit, and can communicate by letter and telephone. …
… are invalid. This was error. We first consider the contention, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that the regulations infringe a constitutional right of association. We have said that the Constitution protects “certain kinds of highly personal relationships,” Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U. S. …
[It’s my understanding that all “relationships” are fictions that exist in our imaginations, but have no tangible reality. If so, then then previous excerpt implies that “associations” are also relationships and therefore fictions.]
… altogether terminated by incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners. We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate …
13. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/540/93.html
… (internal quotation marks omitted). “The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition that ‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and …
… Constitutionally Sufficient Interest In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only one, interest justified the significant burden on the right of association involved there: eliminating, or preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from contributions to candidates. “It is …
12. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/544/581.html
… Party’s attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of association.” 479 U. S., at 214 . Importantly, we rejected the notion that the associational interest was somehow diminished because the voters the party …
11. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/04-37.html
… Party’s attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of association.” 479 U. S., at 214 . Importantly, we rejected the notion that the associational interest was somehow diminished because the voters the party …
10. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/02-94.html
… bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether respondents have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. This Court accords substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a …
… serves the legitimate goal of deterring drug and alcohol use within prison. Second, respondents have alternative means of exercising their asserted right of association with those prohibited from visiting. They can send messages through those who are permitted to visit, and can communicate by letter and telephone. …
… are invalid. This was error. We first consider the contention, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that the regulations infringe a constitutional right of association. We have said that the Constitution protects “certain kinds of highly personal relationships,” Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U. S. …
… altogether terminated by incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners. We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate …
9. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/00-191.html
… Rights of Political Parties, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 197, 315, n. 50 (1977), that view has been subject to debate, see, e.g. , Gottlieb, Fleshing Out the Right of Association, 49 Albany L. Rev. 825, 826, 836-837 (1985); see generally Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes, 101 Colum. L. Rev 274 (2001). There is …
8. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/99-401.html
… by substantial state interests. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: California’s blanket primary violates a political party’s First Amendment right of association. Pp. 4-19. (a) States play a major role in structuring and monitoring the primary election process, but the processes by which political …
… choice, greater participation, increased “privacy,” and a sense of “fairness“–all without severely burdening a political party’s First Amendment right of association. * * * Respondents’ legitimate state interests and petitioners’ First Amendment rights are not inherently incompatible. To the extent …
7. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/03-636.html
… J. , concurring in judgment); Coffin v. Reichard , 143 F. 2d 443, 445 (CA6 1944).
Footnote 4 See, e.g. , Overton , supra , at 132 (the right to association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U. S. 223, 228-229 (2001) (the right to communicate with fellow inmates under …
[One’s “fellow inmates” comprise an “association”?
If so, does being a convict remove you from one “association” in “our free society” and “move” you into another “association” of convicts??
Is the “right of movement” (deemed by the USSC to be “essential” to the “right of association”) purely voluntary? I think it is. If that “movement” includes moving from one association to another, then we might be able to declare that we refuse to move from the “association of our free society” into the “association of convicts”.
Does the “voluntary” element of being imprisoned reflect a prisoner’s “voluntary” movement from “our free society” into the “association of prisoners”? What if, at allocution, defendants refused to move from “our free society” into the “association of convicts”?]
6. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/99-699.html
… 468 U. S., at 626 . In Duarte , we said:
“[I]mpediments to the exercise of one’s right to choose one’s associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment. In this case, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any …
[The “right to choose one’s associates” is derived but separate from the “right of association”.]
… which an organization that truly aims to foster a belief at odds with the purposes of a State’s antidiscrimination laws will have a First Amendment right to association that precludes forced compliance with those laws. But that right is not a freedom to discriminate at will, nor is it a right to maintain an …
… Scouts of America , 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983) (challenge to BSA’s denial of membership to homosexuals; rejecting BSA’s claimed right of association), overruled on other grounds, 17 Cal. 4th 670, 952 P. 2d 218 (1998).
Footnote 10 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976) …
5. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/06-939.html
… to striking workers was justified because “[s]trikers and their union would be much better off if food stamps were available,” but the “strikers’ right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that right”). As far as I can tell, States that do wish to pay …
4. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/97-930.html
… petitions. Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, supra, at 758 (holding that time limits on enrollment in political parties did not violate the right of association because individuals were not prohibited from enrolling in parties). Moreover, as the Chief Justice illustrates in his dissent, this …
[Only men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights. “Political Parties” are entities that receive no rights from God. The fact that the “right of association” attaches to “political parties” tells us that this “right of association” is not God-given or unalienable. ]
3. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/97-1121.html
… v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111 (1969). Its impact on the social contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment “right of association” that our cases have recognized. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U. S. 19, 23-25 (1989). On the other hand, as the United States …
[It appears that a “social contract” is something other than a “right of association” or even an “association”. This faintly suggests that by means of an astute use of the terms “social contract” and “right of association,” I might be able to have “social contract” with “this state” while not actually entering into the “this-state association”.
Alternatively, perhaps the “social contract” only exists within The State, while “associations” are defined to exist only “in this state”.]
2. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/02-1674.html
… (internal quotation marks omitted). “The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition that ‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and …
… Constitutionally Sufficient Interest In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only one, interest justified the significant burden on the right of association involved there: eliminating, or preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from contributions to candidates. “It is …
[Apparently, “associations” are pretty much safe from any challenge—except for actual corruption or even the “appearance” of corruption. If so, and if “this state” is an “association,” then “this state” might be successfully challenged for (and perhaps only for) “corruption” or the “appearance” of corruption.
This implies that I need to learn the exact meaning of “corruption”.]
1. FindLaw Case
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/99-1613.html
… that “inmates have a First Amendment right to assist other inmates with their legal claims.” 195 F. 3d 1121, 1124 (1999). Murphy enjoyed this right of association, the court concluded, because he was providing legal advice that potentially was relevant to Tracy’s defense. The Court of Appeals then applied our …
[I am reminded of the “right to assistance of counsel” that’s guaranteed by the 6th Amendment. The fact that “inmates” have a (First Amendment) right to assist other inmates makes me wonder of the prisons might be located “within The State”. I.e., is it possible that persons (“ADASK”) are convicted “in this state” but the man (“Adask” that volunteered to act as surety for “ADASK”) might be sentenced to serve his penalty “within The State”.]
OK—that’s the end of this article. As I said previously, within the week I should have an additional study of the evolution of “right of association” as reported by the various editions of Black’s Law Dictionary.
And as I said previously, this is BIG.
The “right of association” is the foundation for “this state”. That’s this system’s “heart of freakin’ darkness”.
That’s about as “big” as it gets—at least “in this state”.
Mark Bryan
March 15, 2009 at 1:10 PM
It’s BIG alright—you might want to look up the word “necessity” in your Black’s dictionary.
Your association may be “of necessity” due to circumstances beyond your control, such as using FRNs and negotiable instruments(your signature) to sustain your family.
Dominick Mastroserio not (DOMINICK MASTROSERIO)
May 29, 2011 at 7:00 PM
Is it remembered that that Machiavellian Texan, Lyndon Johnson acted in an unprecedented and probably illegal manner when he chose Chief Justice Earl Warren to head the Whitewash Warren Commission in December, 1963 or January, 1964?
I remember seeing news photos of Warren actually crying after the “arm-twisting”, closed door meeting with the president…and it was reported that he was more than reluctant to do L.B.J.’s bidding but none the less capitulated “for the good of the country” – HA!
A president had usurped the balance of powers between the Supreme Court of the United States of America and its Executive branch by forcing the Chief Justice of it to head a “presidential” Commission investigating the public, high-noon slaughter of the president he replaced…and America reportedly “breathed a sigh of relief”…
Wow – the spinmeisters were crankin’ in high gear.
And he did it merely to bestow an imprimatur of truth to the American people and lend some credibility to that treasonous Commission comprised of spies, toadies, conflict of interest cronies, carreerists and habitual liars.
Arguably, from that time can be detected a notable degeneration of the Supreme Court’s appointees from a highly respected and aloof majesty to unabashed corporatism.
Sorry to have ejaculated in this barely tangential manner but every time I see the year “1964″ cropping up in some “alarm bells going off” manner I have found something unknown to add to that years innumerable “alarm bells going off” events and pronouncements.