RSS

What do you “believe” about “belief”?

03 Feb

The following curious email exchange took place in December between myself and a friend who prefers to remain unnamed.  The exchange touches on the difference between “The State” (of the Union) and “this state” (the unincorporated association/territory/implied charitable trust of the singular United States) and especially on the bizarre importance of “belief” in our legal system.

The conclusions (or at least suspicions) about “belief” are somewhat challenging to understand and hard to “believe”.  Nevertheless, I think those conclusions/suspicions may be roughly correct.

In essence, I’m using this email exchange to explain what I “believe” about “belief”.

In order to appreciate the unexpected power of “belief,” you should read definitions of “belief” in Black’s Law Dictionary—especially in some of the older editions which make clear that all “belief” is hearsay.  That is, all belief is not based on personal perception (direct knowledge), but rather on the opinions of others.  I.e., when I was a child I never actually saw (had direct personal knowledge of) Santa Claus, but I believed because my mother told me Santa was real.  My opinion on Santa Claus was based on hearsay (what I’d heard others say, but hadn’t personally witnessed).  All of your beliefs are likewise based on whatever you’ve been told by others.  All of your beliefs are based on hearsay.

Hearsay is not admissible evidence in a court of law or in an evidentiary hearing.  However, belief based on hearsay is admissible in “argument hearings” and even in administrative or equity courts as premises in arguments—rather than as statements of facts.  Thus, it’s possible to be convicted of a crime or an offense in modern courts based on mere beliefs (hearsay) rather than facts entered into evidence.

The email exchange follows:

Alfred Adask <alfredadask@yahoo.com> wrote:

I haven’t read this case, but the summary (below) suggests that all “qualified immunity” may be based on nothing more than “reasonable belief“.  If an official merely could have “believed” his acts were constitutional, then those acts cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

This makes some sense “in this state” insofar as “this state” is at least not under a State constitution and is only under the federal Constitution insofar as the federal Constitution applies to “territories”.  Technically, “this state” has almost no relation to any constitution, and is probably directly under Congress (rather than constitutions) and, as such, the “officials” need merely know the congressional statutes—but not the federal Constitution.

Insofar as “this state” appears to be an unincorporated association of “private” entities, there is really very little reason for the officials/employees of “this state” to know anything about any State of federal constitution.  And yet, the courts will occasionally hold the officials/employees of “this state” to some constitutional obligations—but why?  Could it be that if the “victim” expressly declared his “belief” that the “official/employee” was an officer of The State (of the Union), that the victim’s “belief” created the “official’s/employee’s” constitutional obligations?

This whole line of insight grows curiouser and curiouser.

In any case, here’s the case excerpt:

U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, December 17, 2009
Mosher v. Nelson, No. 09-1636

“In plaintiffs’ civil rights action brought following the death of their son against a facility operated by the Massachusetts Department of Corrections that serves as both a prison and a mental hospital, its superintendent, and others, summary judgment for defendants is affirmed where:

“1) defendant-superintendent is entitled to qualified immunity as a reasonable official in defendant’s place, given the circumstances and the legal standard, could have believed that allowing a certain practice to continue would not lead to events that would violate a patient’s rights;

“2) commissioner is also entitled to qualified immunity as a reasonable official in his position could have reasonably believed that staffing that met the hospital’s recommendations was sufficient to avoid constitutional violations; and

“3) the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims as barred by the Eleventh AmendmentRead more…

My friend’s response:

Yep, to take away the presumption of official immunity, we have to put them on notice of where we believe we are and that we don’t contract with them.  It is a war of beliefs.

Alfred Adask:

Exactly.  A “war of beliefs”.

We might be well-advised to file our own “Declaration Of Beliefs” into the county record.

If the Officials can claim “qualified immunity” based on their beliefs, why can’t we?  What if I “believe” that I don’t need to fasten my seatbelt, or “believe” that I don’t need a drivers license?  Of course, we can’t simply make “this state” and its onerous, de facto “officers” disappear by simply declaring we “don’t believe” in them.  But if we could support our “disbelief” with evidence, we might give ‘em a real challenge.

And what about the courts’ occasional references to “sincerely-held beliefs” as part of a 1st Amendment, religious freedom issue?

It is a “war of beliefs”.  A kind of “jihad” going on right here for over 70 years.  At bottom, this is a kind of “holy war of beliefs”—spiritual warfare.

Curiouser and curiouser.

My friend’s response:

I have facts.  I have the Texas Declaration of Rights.  It exists.  I can see it, touch it, feel it.  It is real.  I stayed in Texas.  I never left.  I can see Texas.  I can stand on it.  I can dig in it, plow it, and bury the dead in it.

The U.S. citizens left Texas.  They went down the rabbit hole to this state.  They ain’t in “Texas” no more.  They are presumed “in this state,” but they cannot see this state.  They cannot feel it, or touch it.  They may have the illusion that they are in “Texas,” but they are in na-na land.  They are the ones that must believe.

I have reality, I have evidence, and I don’t have a contract with them.  That’s my story and I’m sticking to it.  I don’t need to “believe”.

Alfred Adask:

For most of 15 years, I’ve been fixated on the idea that “trust relationships” (more so than contracts) are the primary mechanism by means of which the people are ensnared by the “system” (this state).  I’m not saying contracts aren’t important, but I’m still inclined to “believe” that trust relationships are more important.

Trust relationships are particularly dangerous because a judge can find that an “implied trust relationship” exists between a plaintiff and defendant even though neither party has used any word that associated with trusts, and neither party has a clue to what a “trust” is.    Once the judge “finds” (believes in) the existence of an implied trust relationship (which is not enforceable) between the parties, he can “construe” and elevate that implied trust relationship to the status of a “constructive trust” relationship that is enforceable against the defendant (implied-fiduciary).

So far as I can tell, these implied trust relationships can be grounds for the plaintiff’s complaint against the defendant—even if the plaintiff has no conscious understanding of trusts, implied trust relationships, etc.  Essentially, the judge can “find” (believe in) the existence of an implied trust relationship based on 1) the plaintiff’s mere conduct and 2) the defendant’s failure to expressly deny having voluntarily entered in to a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff.

What I’m groping for is the idea that the “implied trust relationship” exists solely as a consequence of the plaintiff’s and/or judges “belief” that the defendant owes some moral obligation to the plaintiff that is implied (“believed to exist”) but never expressly stated (as would be required in a contract) or expressly agreed to by the defendant.

The defendant could be fined or go to jail based on the plaintiff’s mere “belief”.   These penalties could be imposed based on the defendant’s failure to expressly deny the plaintiff’s implied beliefs.  If the defendant remains silent concerning the plaintiff’s foundational—but unexpressed “beliefs”—I believe that it will be presumed by the court that the defendant has assented to and provides a second (but silent) witness to the validity of the plaintiff’s “beliefs”.

On the other hand, if the defendant can anticipate or recognize the plaintiff’s foundational “beliefs” and expressly deny them, the whole process would be badly destabilized and, in theory, stopped.

I.e., “I deny under oath that I’ve voluntarily and knowingly entered into any fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff/prosecutor/this state.  It would be unreasonable for the court to find the existence of such a fiduciary relationship where no such voluntary relationship, in fact, exists.  More, it would constitute a violation of the 13th Amendment to subject me to such servitude without my voluntary consent. “

The “implied” trust relationships are ultimately based on the plaintiff’s and/or judge’s mere “beliefs”.  These beliefs can be implied—that is, silent and unexpressed.  (In fact, within the courts of equity, the words “implied” and “believed” might be so closely associated as to be almost synonymous.)

If so, then if a defendant were to expressly challenge the existence of the plaintiff’s ground for believing in the existence of an implied trust relationship, the whole equitable (and perhaps administrative) proceeding could probably be derailed.  Why?  Because, normally, the plaintiff has no idea of what a trust, trust relationship, or implied trust relationship might be.  I.e., if the defendant were to deny the existence of any implied trust relationship between himself and the plaintiff, the plaintiff would normally be too ignorant concerning trust relations to refute or even understand the defendant’s denial.

If a plaintiff were asked under oath if she had ever entered into a fiduciary or trust relationship with the defendant, the vast majority of plaintiffs would admit that they had no idea of what a trust/fiduciary relationship was.  That admission would tend to indicate that despite the plaintiff’s apparent “conduct,” that she could not be reasonably deemed to believe in the existence of a trust relationship if she didn’t know what a trust relationship was.

If the plaintiff’s attorney and/or the judge tried to “lead” the plaintiff into claiming that the defendant owed some “moral obligation” (a basis for implied/believed/argued trust relationships) to the plaintiff, the defendant would have to be prepared to deny such “moral obligation,” or claim a different “morality” or some such.

Those few plaintiffs who were clever enough to expressly claim that they believed there was a fiduciary relationship between themselves and their defendants, could then be asked if they had evidence that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily entered into that trust relationship as a fiduciary.  If there’s no evidence that the defendant had voluntarily agreed to assume the role of fiduciary, imposing that obligation upon the defendant without evidence of his consent (and despite his express, sworn denial of having consented) would constitute an act of “involuntary servitude”—prohibited by the 13th Amendment.

A similar line of defense could be used with contracts.  The plaintiff/prosecutor might “believe” that the defendant had voluntarily and expressly contracted to transact “in this state,” but how could there be a “meeting of the minds” if the defendant had no idea that “this state” was something entirely different from “The State”?

If you read subsection (d) of the Texas Penal Code section 1.04 (Territorial Jurisdiction of “this state”) you’ll see that “This state includes the land and the water and the air space above the land and the water over which this state has power to define offenses.”  Apparently, there are no geographic boundaries to “this state”.  In theory, the territorial jurisdiction of “this state” of TX could extend into Mexico, up to Illinois, or even on to Mars.  Without geographic boundaries, where does “this state” exist?   Without geographic boundaries, how can it be said that the required  “meeting of the minds” took place in a contract deemed to have been negotiated “in this state”?  If there was no “meeting of the minds” as to the situs of the contract, how can the courts of “this state” claim jurisdiction?

It’s hard to “believe,” but increasingly I do “believe” that this whole G.D. system is running on “beliefs” (presumptions, implications, premises etc.) in things that are false.

Insofar as we believe in lies, we become subject to lies, subject to “authorities” that do not, in fact, exist.

I am beginning to feel a little like Lewis Carroll.

Alfred Adask

alfredadask@yahoo.com

http://adask.wordpress.com

About these ads
 

5 responses to “What do you “believe” about “belief”?

  1. Brian

    February 3, 2010 at 11:18 PM

    Al, take a look at this indictment. It is dripping with this belief garbage! You are on to something here!

    http://www.losthorizons.com/Newsletter/CriminalAssault/GovernmentResponseToPersonMTD.pdf

     
  2. Alfred Adask

    February 4, 2010 at 1:37 PM

    Hi Brian,
    Thanks for the link to the Motion to Dismiss. I’m reading it now, but I’m far from finished.

    This Motion to Dismiss not only references elements of “belief,” it also references DEFINITIONS (another subject of strong personal interest) as well as NOTICE (another of my pet theories).

    I’ll post an edited copy of that motion to dismiss on my blog in the next several days.

    Again, thanks for the link.

    Al

     
  3. Harry James

    February 6, 2010 at 4:34 PM

    I have notice that many terms are defined in such a way as to imply that the “thing” being defined is only “deemed” to be what it is defined as being.

    For instance: “A man CONSIDERED [or deemed] according to the rank he holds in society, with all the right to which the place he holds entitles him and the duties which it imposes.” is the definition of the term PERSON.

    CONSIDERED. Deemed; determined; adjudged; reasonably regarded. Evidence may be said to have been “considered” when it has been reviewed by a court to determine whether any probative force should be given it. Taylor v. Gossett, Tex. Civ. App;, 269 S.W. 230, 233 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition.

    DEEM. To hold; consider; adjudge; condemn; determine; TREAT AS IF; construe which gives “deemed” the force of ONLY a “disputable presumption,” or of prima facie evidence. When, by statute, certain acts are “deemed” to be a crime of a particular nature, they ARE such crime, and not a semblance of it, nor a mere fanciful approximation to or designation of the offense. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, pg 504

    Yes, such acts deemed to be a crimes ARE such crimes, but only until properly rebutted or disputed with evidence to the contrary, at which time the evidence “takes the place” of the presumption.

    It certainly appears that all men are “deemed” to be “persons” of a certain rank in society who have waived their right to claim their rights. Of course this is only an assumption and prima facie evidence which may be proved a false presumption when properly disputed with evidence to the contrary.

    DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION. A species of evidence that may be accepted and acted upon when there is no other evidence to uphold contention for which it stands; and when evidence is introduced supporting such contention [or NOT supporting such contention I would think] evidence takes place of presumption, and there is no necessity for indulging in any presumptions. It is a rule of law to be laid down by the court, which SHIFTS to the party against who it operates the burden of evidence merely. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition

    The presumption stands as or similar to real evidence (i.e. prima facie evidence) until properly disputed which then shifts the burden of evidence to the party against whom it operates.

    DISPUTE. A conflict or controversy; a conflict of CLAIM OF RIGHTS; an assertion of a right, claim or demand on one side, MET by contrary claims or allegations on the other. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition

    I suppose there is no real conflict or dispute until an assertion of a right, claim or demand on one side is MET by a contrary claim or allegation on the other. Without a real conflict what is the judge supposed to do but rule in favor of party making the undisputed presumption?

    If all men are considered to be among the class of persons known as 14th amendment citizens of the United States federal government resident in this state or the state then that presumption must be disputed if it is not true. If left undisputed it will stand as prima facie evidence that the man is a person within the class of persons known as citizens of the United States who are subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

    However, all men are supposed to be sui juris upon reaching full age or the age of majority at which time they have all the rights of a freeman. See definition of sui juris in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.

    If a man is not sui juris or at least not considered to be sui juris then he is or considered to be under some legal disability and, as such does not have the capacity to manage his own affairs. In short he does not have full social and civil rights and is deemed to be under the power of another, or guardianship.

    To me it is a matter of one’s presumed status or standing in society that affects one’s exercise of rights and one’s relationship with his property.

    STATUS. Standing, state or condition. The legal relation of individual to rest of the community. The rights, duties, capacities and in-capacities which DETERMINE a PERSON to a given class. A legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which THIRD PERSONS and THE STATE are concerned. While term implies relation it is NOT mere relation. It also means ESTATE, because it signifies the condition or circumstances in which one stands with regard to his property.

    It is my guess that a man who is deemed to be a person in the class of persons known as citizens of the United States federal government are in a condition or circumstance in which they cannot own property absolutely.

    Everything a servant owns must belong to his master. Thus our estate is an interest in the property less than absolute title to it. The land we think we own absolutely is really owned conditionally or according to our presumed condition as being subjects and servants of and to the federal government who are resident aliens within “this State” or perhaps “the State.” In either case servants cannot own land absolutely thus we are all defined in the deed to our land as being a tenant or “tenants in common.”

    It appears to me that unless a sui juris man can own a piece of land absolutely he would have no place to exercise and enjoy his absolute Creator given rights absolutely, without causing harms to his neighbors of course.

    All men are born equally free and independent but they cannot exercise and enjoy their rights to life, liberty and property until they reach the age of majority and come out from under the authority of their parents. It also appears upon reaching the age of majority a man or woman must properly and belligerently claim all the rights of a freeman that they have. If they do not properly make this claim of right they are considered or deemed or presumed to have waive the right to make the claim and ignorance of this fact is no excuse.

    The Supreme Court ruled: “Every person is purported to know the law, and unless YOU become a belligerent CLAIMANT of YOUR rights YOU are CONSIDERED [i.e. deemed or presumed] to have acquiesced, and ignorance is no excuse….”

    “Belligerents” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition means: “lawful and legal warfare between two States or nations of people and recognized by International Law.”

    Two States? Could “this State” and “a Union state” be deemed to be two States with two nations of people?”

    It appears that everything that goes on in “this State” is based on the presumption that everyone is a person subject to the jurisdiction thereof – i.e. a 14th Amendment citizen of the United States federal government and the State wherein they reside.

    How does a man belligerently claim his rights is the question?

    Any suggestions?

     
  4. adask

    February 7, 2010 at 6:12 PM

    I’m not sure how to deal with definitions. In general, I believe the solution is to claim to use some definition from a source/authority that is not of “this state” and can’t easily be denied by “this state”. But this sort of linguistic “fencing” must begin no later than the gov-co’s first notice to you. Ideally, your alternative definitions should be claimed and employed BEFORE the gov-co assaults you. This preemptive strategy might work by filing a list of key definitions into the public record, or by including a list of YOUR definitions with every document you file with government.

    As for claiming your unalienable Rights as a “man” (not “person,” “citizen,” or some other label), I think the key is to recognize that the unalienable Right flow to men from GOD. That makes your claim of God-given, unalienable Rights more than a mere political or even legal claim–it is a spiritual claim based and supported by the Freedom of Religion guaranteed at the 1st Amendment.

    I identify myself as a “man created in our Father YHWH Elohiym’s image (as per Genesis 1:26-28) and self-evidently endowed by by Creator (as per the Declaration of Independence) with certain unalienable Rights.” Gov-co can’t deny that claim of religious faith without breaching the 1st Amendment and whatever guarantees of religious freedom are enshrined in The Constitution of The State of Texas.

    I’m not saying gov-co won’t breach our religious freedoms. But they are very, very reluctant to do so if there’s a chance that the public might find out.

     
  5. Dominick Mastroserio not (DOMINICK MASTROSERIO)

    May 22, 2011 at 5:21 PM

    Based on the legal definition of “belief” everything, including the reliability of evidence, witness testimony and reality itself is, by extention, hearsay.

    The law would have us believe that they can define “belief” – and that is the greatest hearsay of all…for even direct, personal knowledge, when transmitted, becomes hearsay, if we “believe” the law dictionary’s definition.

    For even the law dictionary’s definitions must be constured as hearsay despite the fact that we are holding the volume in our hands and its physical objectivity obviates its corporeal existence…despite the fact that the words contained therein are written in “black and white” – after all, its definitions are but a jurisprudentially and “consensually” agreed upon, temporarily codified “objectivity” whose meanings are forever being revised, tweaked and amendend according to its laguage’s contemporary or traditional usage, according to whatever political or ideological “insights” its authors are constrained to adhere to by the ordinate frame of their field of expertise.

    The problem is not that an objective reality does not exist but that that objective reality is conditioned by billions of subjectivities interpreting that objective reality.

    The law is therefore not only an “ass” but a tyrannical ass.

    That is, more or less, what I believe.

     

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,009 other followers