The following letter was allegedly written by Senator Tom Harkins of Iowa. There is some question as to whether the Senator is the true author or if the entire document can be attributed solely to Harkin(s). It is rumored that Al Barcroft called Senator Harkin(s)’ office to ask if he wrote this letter, and the Senator allegedly would neither confirm nor deny.
I wouldn’t absolutely bet that Harkins it the true or sole author of this document, but there is so much insightful information in the original that whoever wrote this document appears to be surprisingly knowledgeable about the difference between “The State” and “this state”.
A pristine, “unedited” copy follows after this document.
SENATOR HARKINS – IRS KNOWLEDGE
Although the [private?] IR Code [IRC does not equal Title 26?] is used as the basis for the so called income tax, the personal income tax does not derive its authority from the 16th Amendment, Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR or any other constitutional or federal provision, as those authorities fell with the loss of our national money standard in 1933.
[I am surprised to hear that the “constitutional and federal . . . authorities fell with the loss of our national money standard in 1933.” I wouldn’t think that these “authorities” could “fall” until the silver was removed from circulation in the late A.D. 1960’s. Harkins implies that only gold comprised the “national money standard” and I doubt that’s true.
Nevertheless, I agree that at least by the A.D. 1970—by which time both the gold and silver coin had been removed—and since, that the “national money standard” has been “disappeared” and probably doesn’t exist to any meaningful degree today.
But what does Harkins mean by “constitutional or federal provision”? Which constitution—State or US? Which of “those authorities fell”? I read Article 1.10.1 to mean that only the constitutions of the States of the Union would be impaired by the loss of specie, but I see no associated disability for the federal Constitution. I suspect that “federal provision” may be statutes enacted for The United States of America rather than the “United States”—but the term “federal provision” is still mysterious.]
Since 1933, the people have formed new a new unincorporated United States in [implied, charitable] trust by their silence in accepting the loss of their ability for paying their debts at law.
[Implication: the fact that we use FRNs may not be determinative. The fact that we use FRNs “silently”—without express protest—may be the critical fact. If so, we can probably use FRNs without disability or being drawn into “this state” so long as we disclaim or qualify such use.
In any case, consistent with my recent conclusions concerning the “implied charitable trust” referred to as “this state,” it appears that the fundamental charity is of “this state” is allowing the great unwashed the benefit of using FRNs in a fictional “state”/plane to discharge rather than pay their debts.]
In other words, the suspension of our national money standard created a void in the law.
[Then “law” did not disappear in its entirety, but a void was created by the absence of “national money” (specie).
The phrase “national money” appears only once in a Findlaw search of the USSC in a case dated A.D. 1979. The meaning appears insignificant and more likely to apply to FRNs than to specie.]
è Consequently, a resulting or implied [charitable] trust rushed in to fill the void. In a resulting or implied trust, there are no terms of how and who is to administer the terms of the trust, therefore you cannot put the blame on anyone besides the people for letting the trust be established.
[Yes, yes, yes. I didn’t get it the first time I read it, but I get it now. These are essentially the same conclusions I’ve recently reached on my own, and reading Harkins letter, I can see that what was confusing in June of A.D. 2007, is now almost crystalline clear in March of A.D. 2008.
The new “implied [charitable] trust” has “no terms” precisely because it’s “implied” (unwritten). But the statement “no terms of how and how is to administer” both surprises me and makes perfect sense. The administrative process for the implied charitable trust must be private, and probably on a case-by-case basis. This gives rise to the “de facto” and probably to the “de facto” officer immunity. Why? Perhaps because the “de facto” officers are attempting to administer the implied charitable trust in their private capacity and without being paid (no specie). If so, the de facto officers—without being actually paid by specie—might be presumed to be acting out of charity to administer the implied trust on behalf of the innumerable and unnamed beneficiaries.
I’ll bet that there is little or no liability for fiduciaries of charities. But I’ll also bet that there is still at least some very specific and limited liabilities for charitable trust fiduciaries. I suspect that if those specific liabilities for the fiduciaries of charities could be identified, they might be employed as grounds to sue de facto officers of “this state”.
In any case, if the administration of the implied charitable trust of “this state” is without terms or how or who, all that should be required to defeat the process of “this state” is 1) an express demand to proceed under the laws of the express charitable trust of The State; and 2) and express refusal to trust the judge/officer/ administrator to proceed under the “unspecified terms” of the implied charitable trust of “this state”. You probably have to expressly declare that you don’t “trust” the judge, don’t call him “honorable,” etc. so as to preclude any possibility that your conduct can be presumed to imply that you’ve accepted him as the fiduciary to administer the implied charitable trust.
As for “you cannot put the blame” on anyone but the people—that’s a lie, at least insofar as Harkins is attempting to exempt the government and its officers and employees from liability. Insofar as Harkins is correct is correct that the “people” are to blame, some people are probably more to blame than others. Those most liable would be those in the gov-co who secretly masquerade as if they were officers and employees of The State while they are actually “privateers” working in “this state”.
But it’s also possible that when Harkins writes that only the “people” can be blamed, he might mean the “people-as-beneficiaries”. If so, the “charitable fiduciaries” might be exempt from liability since the “people-beneficiaries” have not expressly complained.
All the rationales are just so much crap, however, since the officers of the government forced the loss of “national money” and thereby committed treason against the express charitable trust called The United States of America. FDR didn’t ask for the gold, he took it by force. The Supreme Court justices and Legislative officers backed him up, and the national “authorities” were thereby “overthrown” in an act of incredible treason.]
“The United States Government may be the trustee of a charitable trust,” Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S 163; 27 L.Ed. 397, and further; The United States or a state has capacity to take and hold property upon a charitable trust, but in absence of a statute otherwise providing, the [implied?] charitable trust is unenforceable against the United States or a state.”
[First, I believe the court is talking about the implied “charitable trust” rather than the express charitable trust.
Second, I again suspect that the beneficiary of an implied charitable trust can’t sue his fiduciaries in an implied charitable trust that has “no terms of how or who is to administer”. More, the beneficiary might be presumed to be the “grantor” who essentially “created” the implied charitable trust and “employed” the de facto officer to act as his fiduciary for no pay. I.e., you probably can’t sue someone who is giving you charity at your own (implied) request.
But third, what does the court mean by “The United States Government” and “The United States or a state”? The term “United States Government” sounds very much like the de jure. Maybe yes, maybe no. Gotta read that case. But is it possible that the de jure is still active and given the “option” of administering both the express and implied charitable trusts?
In other words, the code does not define who is required to file and what the terms are, but when you use the IR Code as your argument, you admit to conveying your estate to the public trust, thus all your arguments have little or no merit. It then is a constant battle finding niches in the code which the IRS eventually overcomes and it comes down to how much you owe and when you are going to pay. In the mean time, you cannot own anything because they put a lien on it and it is hell getting rid of the lien.
[OK—by using the private law of the IRC, you subject yourself to the IRC. That’s not hard to grasp.
But to declare that by merely using (referring to) the IRC, you admit to conveying your “estate” to the “public trust” is a surprise. This implies that the IRC (private law other than 26 USC?) and the “public trust” are attributes of the “implied charitable trust” rather than the express charitable trust of The State. More—if it’s true that Title 26 and the IRC are two entirely different authorities—this declaration concerning your “estate” also implies that by expressly referring to Title 26, you might keep your “estate” out of the “public trust” of the “implied charitable trust” and leave it under the express charitable trust.
Given that Title 26 goes back in time to, perhaps, A.D. 1900 or even earlier, and presuming that the “grant” of your “estate” to the public trust is something that’s only taken place since A.D. 1933, then it would appear that there was no “automatic” grant of your estate to the “public trust” under Title 26 prior to A.D. 1933. This tentatively supports the idea that the IRC is something that may have been created since A.D. 1933, something different from Title 26 in that the IRC does move your “estate” into the “public trust”. I.e., we have tentative evidence to support the idea that the IRC and Title 26 are two very distinctly different authorities—one linked to the implied charitable trust, the other linked to the express charitable trust.
But whether Title 26 and the IRC are two different authorities (one tied to the express charitable trust, the other to the implied charitable trust) is still unclear.
In either case, if Senator Harkins is right, by mere use/reference to the IRC (and perhaps Title 26) you are presumed to have “conveyed” your “estate” to the “public trust”.
I absolutely do not understand how such presumption could have originated or how it can be sustained. I don’t have even have a hunch, suspicion or a guess. That’s rare for me. This implies that either the assertion that we “convey” our “estates” to the public trust by virtue of merely using the IRC is false, or there is a profound and extraordinary secret to learned that’s buried somewhere in the creation of the IRC.
Senator Harkins continues to explain that because we’ve conveyed our “estates” to the public trust, “all your arguments” against the IRS “have little or no merit”. This implies that, because we no longer hold (at least) legal title to our “estates” but have instead conveyed that legal title to the public trust, that we have no legal right to argue against the IRS.
This probably means that we simply lack standing as mere “donors” of property (our “estates”) to the “implied charitable trust” (that has “no terms” as to who and how it is administered), we have no standing to complain about how that charitable trust is administered.
Why? Maybe, Maybe, because you and I, as living beings, relate to the IRS not as beneficiaries or even fiduciaries, but rather as “donors”. Note that Senator Harkins talked about how use of the IRC creates the presumption that we’ve “conveyed our estates to the public trust”.
What our “estates” may be remains to be determined, but for now, if we simply think in terms of “conveying” some property to the “public trust,” one thing seems apparent: It is strange enough to suppose that by merely using the IRC (how?) we “convey” our “estates” to the “public trust”. But are we to believe that besides such conveyance, we are also presumed to have applied for the position of “beneficiary” of that public trust? Or have we instead also voluntarily assumed the role of fiduciary for the public trust?
The point I’m making is that maybe—maybe—the process with the IRC at least begins with nothing more than the presumption that, by means of using the IRC, we have conveyed our “estates” to the “public trust”. As such, we might be nothing more than “donors” in the same sense that you might “donate” some of your money or property to any charity, and still had no standing as beneficiary or fiduciary for that charity.
This is beginning to make a little sense to me. It’s pure speculation without supporting evidence, but I’m beginning to see a hypothesis:
When you die, the probate court administers your “estate”. Your “estate” is something that you apparently own while you live, but is separate from you when you die. Your “estate” is a “decedent”—which is to say that it’s not alive, but it’s not say that it ever was alive and them died. As I understand it, a decedent is like a corporation—an entity that that is “dead” but always was and never actually “died” because it never was alive. I believe the name for your estate (as seen on tombstones) is spelled in all upper-case letters. I’m beginning to suspect that the “estate” that we convey to the “public trust” might be the same “entity” that many describe as the “strawman,” the “legal fiction,” etc.
Alternatively, our “estate” might be our account with SS. We donate/contribute our income to the SSA by means of our withholding. We are certainly participating in an retirement fund of some sort. Yep—this is the self-insurance fund that Harkins talks about later in this letter. Eveyone insures everyone else. That’s why there’s no money in your particular SS account. Instead, they merely keep track of your contributions to the SS general fund and/or “public trust” and dole out something to you when you retire from the incoming funds of the next generation of SS “contributors”. You’re not insured by your own contributions, per se, you’re insured by the next generation. You “earn” your retirement income by contributing from your own income to support the previous generation of retirees.
It’s like one of those retirement homes where the retirees have to donate all of their earthly wealth to the retirement home, which then takes care of them until they die. The retirees convey their entire “estates” to the “private trust” of the retirement home, and the home then provides for them. These provisions are equal among all retirees and without regard to the actual contribution of any one retiree.
In the case of the “public trust” (and that might BE the SS general fund)—we contribute to it throughout our working lives, and then they support us when we retire. They don’t support us according to the amount we paid in so much as according to whether we continued to pay during our lifetimes. In, you might contribute enough to the SS account that, under ordinary principles of compound interest and government-sanctioned interest rates, by the time you retire, your total contributions to SS might have grown in value to $800,000. At just 5% interest, when you retire, you could theoretically draw $40,000 a year in interest from your $800,000 you saved/contributed to in SS—that’s over $3,000 a month and still have $800,000 to pass on to your heirs when you died. But under SS, although your contributions might amount to $800,000, you’ll only receive $1,500 a month—a return equivalent to about 2.5% interest and never have a chance to spend the $800,000 principal or bequeath it to your children.
I think I get it.
If the previous conjecture were true and if Senator Harkins’ were text accurate, the SS account would have to have some fundamental link to the “public trust”—and the IRC and IRS would be the means of keeping all the “contributors” honest. When you conveyed your “estate” (SSA?) to the “public trust,” The “public trust” and SS are either closely linked or synonymous. The IRC and/or the IRS are the collection rules and agency for the “public trust”/SS retirement fund. If you have a SSA, you’re deemed to be a not merely a contributor to the retirement fund—but a “pledgee” of sorts who’s promised to devote some significant portion of all of his income to the “public trust”. Once you make that pledge, they won’t let you out of it. At least not so long as you have a SSA. Unlike most charitable giving, once you take the SSN, it’s no longer discretionary as to whether you contribute or how much you contribute to the “public trust”—it’s mandatory.
And the IRS/IRC will enforce your pledge. The IRS/IRC will enforce your promised pledges to the “public trust”. Once you have the SSA, if you fail to contribute, you’ll be punished—just like some old timer who claims he’s given all of his wealth to the retirement home, but actually squirreled away $100,000 for himself or to leave to his kids, or some such.
All of this makes me suspect that Harkins may have been mistaken or lying when he alleged that by merely using the IRC we are presumed to have conveyed our estates to the “public trust”. Unless the IRC and the SS are so intimately linked as to be nearly identical, it’s not using the IRC that constitutes your “conveyance” of your “estate” to the “public trust”—it’s your use of the SSN. ]
You must also remember that you are also considered a beneficiary to the trust and as such, unjust enrichment comes into play.
[First, the author previously implied that by “conveying” our “estates” to the public trust we can be deemed donors or grantors to that public trust. Now, the author declares that we are “also” beneficiaries of that trust. Maybe so, but I’m more inclined to see us as fiduciaries to that public trust rather than beneficiaries—at least during our working years.
Hmph. When I think about, it is conceivable that we could be both beneficiaries and fiduciaries to the same public trust—so long as we held those offices at different times. For example, while we are working (and being paid in FRNs?), we could be considered fiduciaries for the public trust’s beneficiaries, but after we retire or otherwise stop working, we might become beneficiaries of the same trust.
That’s pure conjecture, but it makes some sense. We might work for (be employed by?) the public trust as fiduciary “drones” throughout our working lives by contributing some considerable portion of our income to the public trust in the form of SS contributions and/or taxes. Our contributions and taxes would help support trust beneficiaries (retirees and the unemployed) during our working lives. I.e., the money you pay into SS today would not go into your private account, but would instead be used immediately to help support the retiree currently living across the street or the man who’s currently out of work due to illness or unemployment.
Under this hypothesis—as children (before we start working) and as adults who can’t work (welfare recipients) or adults that are prevented from working by illness or unemployment) or as adults who are old enough to retire from the ranks of the employed fiduciaries—we would be beneficiaries who are to some degree cared for by the public trust. But during the prime of our lives, when most of us are employed, we would be fiduciaries for the public trust who provided the funds required to support the beneficiaries.
The critical determinant in this hypothesis is the concept of “employment”. If you are employed, or even capable of “employment,” you would be a fiduciary expected to make contributions to the public trust. But whenever your employment ended or you otherwise became incapable or perhaps even “exempt” from “employment,” you would become a beneficiary of the public trust who was therefore entitled to “benefits” such as retirement income, unemployment income, Medicaid and Medicare, etc..
In broad strokes, if you’re employed (or employable) you’re a fiduciary; if you’re unemployed or unemployable, you’d be a beneficiary. If true, this would mean that the unemployed would have more rights than those who actually work and make a productive contribution to society. It sounds insane, doesn’t it? It sounds impossible. And yet, when we look at modern society, do we or do we not see evidence that the people on welfare have more rights than people who work for a living? I’m not saying that my hypothesis is true, but I am saying that it’s possible.
And, if my hypothesis concerning employment as the mark of being a fiduciary were true, what is the critical essence of such employment? I’d bet money—if any were in circulation and I had some—that the essence of employment is being paid in legal tender (FRNs) rather than specie. Is it possible that the definition of “employment” is the acceptance of legal tender rather than specie for your work? You and I both know that such speculation is not merely possibly true, but perhaps even probably true.
But insofar as “employment” may, by definition, rely on use of FRNs to discharge a debt return for our labor, it’s not impossible that employment itself could be construed as a kind of benefit. IF so, my previous hypothesis might be mistaken insofar as it deems employment to necessarily implicate the status as a fiduciary. I’ll get into this later.
For now, it appears to me that all transactions denominated in legal tender/FRNs must be unequal. The payor (beneficiary) gets the benefit of discharging his debts with worthless pieces of paper. But the payee (fiduciary who supplied his labor, services and/or tangible products) gets screwed. In other words, as a beneficiary of the public trust, I can take $1,000 in legal tender to the local computer store and purchase a new computer. I get a shiny new computer that has a tangible reality and intrinsic value; in return, the computer store gets ten $100 bills—ten pieces of paper that are intrinsically worthless. I have taken possession of the tangible computer without ever actually paying for it. I have discharged my debt, but I haven’t paid it. The computer store gets ten $100 bills that everyone knows are intrinsically worthless, but the computer store owner accepts the worthless papers because he is confident that he, in turn, can pass those ten worthless pieces of paper off on his employees in return for their labor. And the employees accept the worthless paper in return for their work, their time, their lives because they are confident that the local grocer or bartender will be happy to accept those worthless pieces of paper in return for groceries or beer.
This system seems harmless, perhaps even beneficial, so long as no one loses confidence in their ability to transact with legal tender. Once people begin to realize that the $100 bills are only worth a few pennies, the perceived value of the “dollar” falls dramatically. That fall is not a reflection on the intrinsic worth of the legal-tender “dollar” but rather a reflection of the public’s loss of confidence in the value of the legal-tender dollar. The Federal Reserve System has admitted in several of its publications that the value of the dollar is ultimately based on the confidence of the American people. That’s absolutely true. When the public confidence in the dollar falls, the dollar’s value falls.
And that’s exactly what’s happening now: the dollar’s losing value as a reflection of the loss of public confidence. The government and Federal Reserve are doing nothing to increase the intrinsic value of the dollar. They can’t do anything to increase the dollar’s intrinsic value, because the legal-tender dollar doesn’t have any intrinsic value beyond that of the paper, ink and now plastic “security” strip that are used to make each Federal Reserve NOTE. Since A.D. 1970, the dollar has had no intrinsic value anywhere on earth, and thus since then, the only thing the Federal Reserve and/or the gov-co could do was try to inspire public confidence. The masters of the universe can’t change the value of the dollar because it has no value. They can only try to change the public’s confidence in the dollar. And that’s exactly what they’re doing: they’re trying to act as if they are in control, as if the dollar had intrinsic value, as if the public will be inspired renewed confidence by government big-wigs mystically tinkering with the “money supply” or the “prime rate”.
But the government’s attempts to restore “confidence” aren’t working. And the faster the dollar falls in perceived value, the faster public confidence falls. We have a spiraling effect that feeds on itself and is accelerating even as I write. Where is the bottom of this spiral? A: At the point where the public realizes that the FRN has no value beyond the worth of its paper, ink and plastic components.
The government is faced with an impossible task: They must now instill public confidence in the value of a dollar that has no intrinsic value. It can’t be done.
To say “it can’t be done” might seem like a mistake. After all, we’ve used the worthless legal tender throughout most of my life time. The public has had confidence in the worthless pieces of paper we call Federal Reserve Notes for several generations—so why couldn’t they have confidence again?
The answer is that the “system” didn’t start with worthless pieces of paper, it didn’t start with “legal tender”—it started with “tender”; it started with “specie”—gold and silver coins that had intrinsic value. And then, slowly, over the course of several generations the system convinced public that pieces of paper (“gold certificates” and “silver certificates”) that could be traded for gold and silver coins were just as good as gold and silver coins. Later, when the gold and silver coins were removed from circulation, we were told that the mere paper FRNs were “as good as gold”.
My point is that a monetary system would seem to always begin with tender, with specie, with gold and/or silver coins that had intrinsic value and then slowly evolve into legal tender, paper and digital currency that have no intrinsic value. In almost every case, national money systems start with specie and evolves into legal tender. I doubt very much that there has ever been a fiat currency that was simply and successfully imposed on a people except at the point of a bayonet backed by price controls. Even then, such emergency legal tender and price controls couldn’t last for long since, as in the former Soviet Union, when the politicians control the prices of all products, they will favor some and disfavor others creating economic imbalances that result in absurdities and enormous waste and the eventual collapse of the entire economic system.
This analysis tells me that when the dollars dies—as it almost certainly will within the next two to five years—its replacement will either be a specie-backed currency or it will be script backed by price controls which are imposed at the point of a gun. When the dollar dies, we’re either going back to gold and silver or we’re going to a military dictatorship. Either transition will be traumatic, even horrific. But if we go to script and price controls enforced by a military dictatorship, the military dictatorship will fall under the weight of irrational price controls and we will then go back to a specie-based currency. When it comes to money, nothing lasts but gold and silver. The world might manage to wean itself from those metals for even a century, but I believe that, inevitably, the world will be forced back to specie by the inherent madness and even ungodliness of legal tender.
In any case, I started running down the last rabbit trail about money with the observation that all transactions denominated in legal tender may be inherently unequal. Why? Again, because the “payor” gets the benefit of discharging his debts with worthless pieces of paper (rather than paying with specie). When I spend ten $100 bills to purchase a new computer, I get a new, tangible computer and the computer store receives nothing in return but virtually worthless pieces of paper.
I understand that one of the essential attributes of contracts is that the two parties must have roughly equal bargaining power. This to mean that the two parties must have roughly equal rights and privileges. To lesser extent, this means that if I buy a car worth $10,000, the seller gives me the tangible car and I have to pay him the equivalent in tangible wealth. But if I had the RIGHT to discharge my debt with “legal tender” rather than pay my debt with specie, the seller would not have a correlative right, but rather a correlative DUTY to accept the legal tender of worthless paper in return for his tangible car. I would have a right; the seller would have a correlative duty. That’s not a contract. That’s a trust relationship.
Transactions denominated in FRNs are trust relationships. They might even be implied trust relationships. But it grows increasingly clear that the legal tender/FRN is the lifeblood, the essential attribute and characteristic of the “implied charitable trust” and/or “public trust”. If you use FRNs without protest, you’re presumed to have voluntarily entered into the “implied charitable/public trust”.
As a buyer transacting in FRNs, you’re the beneficiary having the equitable right to discharge (rather than pay) your debts; as the seller, you’re the fiduciary with the government-imposed DUTY (inherent in the concept of “legal tender” that must (or at least can) be accepted for all debts public and private) to “sell” (or more probably to “donate”) your products, services, labor, etc., into the public trust in return for nothing but a promise to pay—perhaps, ultimately, a promise that the public trust/implied charitable trust, will provide for you in your old age.
Point: All transactions in FRNs implicate a trust relationship where the buyer is the beneficiary and the seller is the fiduciary.
Implication: If all transactions with FRNs implicate inequality between the parties and a trust relationship, all such transactions would be litigated in equity rather than at law.
Implication: If the seller of labor, services or products were forced to relinquish his life-energy and/or tangible wealth as a fiduciary in return for worthless FRNs to the buyer-beneficiary, that would constitute involuntary servitude (slavery) expressly forbidden by the 13th Amendment (as well as some State constitutions). That’s a big No-No.
We’re getting close to a potentially profound insight that might be found in the answer the following question: Is the seller forced to sell his products for worthless FRNs and if so, how is that force applied without being deemed “involuntary servitude”?
I see several possible answers—any one or all of which might be true:
1) The seller is not truly forced to accept FRNs but has a choice to sell or not, and might insist on being paid in specie rather than FRNs. So long as the seller has the choice to sell for FRNs or not to sell for FRNs, there is no implication of involuntary servitude.
2) The “seller” does not truly own the labor, services or products that he is “selling” and thus his acceptance of legal tender could not constitute “involuntary servitude”. This is consistent with Senator Harkins’ claim that by virtue of “using the IRC” (I’d guess that the use of SS is more likely the central issue) we have “conveyed our estates” to the public trust.
3) The seller has voluntarily assumed the role of fiduciary and thus cannot protest being forced to sell for mere legal tender based on “involuntary servitude”.
One of the fundamental disclaimers for a free man might be “at arm’s length” (which would separate you from the public trust and/or implied charitable trust). Another would be something along the lines of “I deny that I have ever voluntarily and knowingly donated, granted or conveyed all or part of my estate to any express or implied trust, fund, or entity nor will I consent to ever do so by means of mere conduct, moral obligation or operation of law.” If Senator Harkins is correct, the heart of the system is the presumption that we have each voluntarily conveyed our “estate” to the “public trust”. Expressly deny and refute that presumption, and you can probably skate away from “this state,” the “implied charitable trust” and/or the “public trust”.
I’ve wandered a long ways from Senator Harkins letter. Let’s get back to it.
In Senator Harkins’ preceding sentence he referred to “unjust enrichment” as applied to beneficiaries:
That surprised me because my understanding of trusts has been that “unjust enrichment” applies to fiduciaries rather than beneficiaries. I.e., if a fiduciary takes a “benefit” to which only beneficiaries are entitled, that results in (and the fiduciary can be charge for) “unjust enrichment”. However, reading Black’s 8th definition of “unjust enrichment,” it appears that charge might be leveled against both fiduciaries and beneficiaries.
I.e., Black’s first definition would seemingly apply to fiduciaries and perhaps even persons who are not “officially” associated with the trust: “1. The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected.”
Thus, it is at least theoretically possible that circumstances could exist where a beneficiary received something from a trust, but still had to provide some compensation in return. For example, suppose I were a beneficiary of a trust (something like Sam’s Club) that was structured in a way that allowed me to purchase products at cost, or even for just 10% of their face value. As beneficiary, I would enjoy the benefit of remarkably low prices, but I would still be required to pay something for whatever I purchased or otherwise came to possess. If I came to possess trust benefits without paying some minimum compensation for that benefit, I would be guilty of “unjust enrichment”.
What if the use of legal tender/FRNs were a benefit of an implied charitable trust and/or “public trust” called “this state”? Then would it be possible that the circumstances of that trust relationship would be such that even though I enjoyed the benefit of being able to discharge my debts with legal tender, I might still have to pay something for that benefit? Would it be possible that at the end of the year I might have to make a partial “return” of whatever income in received in legal tender to the public trust that provided that benefit?
The answer clearly could be Yes.
And if I failed to make such return of some part of my income to the “implied charitable trust” that provided the benefit of using legal tender to discharge, could I be charged with “willful failure to pay income taxes”? And would the underlying theory on which such charge was based be “unjust enrichment”?
The answer could be Yes.
And what would happen if I expressly denied that I was a member of the “public trust” and/or the “implied charitable trust”? The government can’t compel someone to accept a benefit, and they can’t compel someone to accept the “servitude” of becoming a fiduciary. If the IRS couldn’t prove that I had voluntarily assumed the office of beneficiary or fiduciary of the public trust/implied charitable trust, could they still charge me with unjust enrichment? I don’t see how. Clearly, “unjust enrichment” is a concept that is trust-related. If you’re not related to a trust, I doubt that you can be charged with unjust enrichment. But is “willful failure to pay income taxes” ultimately based on the theory of unjust enrichment? I think so, but I’m not sure.
In all of this, I’m beginning to catch a faint whiff of HJR 192 and the BIC strategy that’s currently banging around the legal reform community.
Consider the plight of the poor seller-fiduciary. He sells his labor, his services, his products, his wealth and even life for worthless pieces of paper and, at most, a promise that if he lives long enough to retire, the “implied charitable trust”/“public trust” will take care of him in his “dotage”. IF the seller is actually forced to accept FRNs/legal tender by law or necessity, he’s being robbed. Yes, there’s a promise that he will be paid at some time in the distant future, but in fact, everyone knows that that promise will never be fulfilled.
Is it possible that the BIC-interpretation of HJR 192 might be correct and based on the notion that “involuntary sellers” must somehow be compensated for any sale wherein they were “forced” to accept worthless legal tender for their intrinsically valuable energy or products? If you object to the disability of being paid in legal tender, can you seek some compensation under HJR 192??
Alternatively, is it possible that the buyer-beneficiary is the one being compensated under HJR 192? Under the BIC strategy, the one with the receipts gets compensation—that would be the buyer-beneficiary rather than the seller-fiduciary. Alternatively, the debtor can liquidate existing debts with legal tender provided by the Treasury Department or some such. Again, that “debtor” would seem to be the buyer-beneficiary of a particular transaction rather than the seller-fiduciary.
Hmph. Makes little sense to me.
Why would the beneficiary-buyer—who has already received the benefit of discharging his debts with fundamentally worthless legal tender—be subsequently compensated with the additional benefit of supplying him with even more “free” legal tender from the Treasury Department?
It seems to me that IF anyone had a BIC-based claim on the public trust/ implied charitable trust, it would be the seller-fiduciaries who are essentially “forced” to surrender their life-energy and their products to the “public trust” in return for nothing but distant promises.
So far, I’m reading the BIC strategy and my current analysis of “this state” to be contradictory. Perhaps the BIC and my theories can be harmonized, but for the moment, I don’t see how.
Refer again to Black’s first definition “unjust enrichment”: “1. The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected.” I’m intrigued to see the word “expected” since the USSC uses variations of that term regularly in applications where we might expect them to use “rights”. I.e., the USSC might write, “The plaintiff had an expectation of due process” rather than “The plaintiff had a right to due process”.
Shee-oot—I think I get it! In the express charitable trust, the beneficiaries have express “rights”. But in an implied charitable trust (which has “no terms” as to who or how it is administered and presumably no express statement of “rights”), the plaintiff/beneficiary could not have “express rights” but he would certainly have some “expectations” of conduct and/or property that would seem very similar to “rights”. I’ll bet that’s the significance of “expectations” (at least sometimes): the implied beneficiary of an implied trust cannot have “rights” (at least not until that implied trust is construed by a court into a “constructive trust”), but he certainly has “expectations” as to, at minimum, a sort of “fairness”. If this analysis were valid, then every time we see a court talk about “expectations,” we should at least suspect that the court is starting its analysis with the possible existence of an implied trust.
Black’s 8th’s second definition for “unjust enrichment” is “2. A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or recompense.”
Again, we can see a justification for a “return” of some sort or restitution, compensation etc. based on the acceptance of a benefit that was not a gift (as would probably be true for beneficiaries) and is not legally justifiable (as would probably describe acceptance of a benefit by a fiduciary). This second definition is subtly different from the first, but both allow that someone receiving benefits can be required to make a return of some of those benefits or of something comparable as a requirement for receiving those benefits. I am surprised. I would’ve thought that unjust enrichment applied strictly to fiduciaries. The first two definitions almost suggest that unjust enrichment applies primarily to beneficiaries.
The third definition is something of a mystery: “3. The area of law dealing with unjustifiable benefit of this kind.” What th’ heck does that mean? I have a hunch that the phrase “area of the law” probably means area of the public law that applies to “unjust enrichment”. If so, by contrast, the first two definitions may apply only to private trust relationships. I’ll bet that’s true. It’s the private trusts that are more likely include a requirement for some sort of return to the trust for acceptance of benefits. It’s not impossible, but I suspect that trusts under public law can’t easily (perhaps can’t possibly) impose some requirement for a return for the receipt of benefits.]
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution states: “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”
[No new “States” of the Union. But there’s no similar restriction on new “territories” and/or “states”.]
Article IV, Sec. 3 clearly states that in order to establish new incorporated States under the Constitution, the legislatures and Congress must follow the Constitutional rules. But, being there is no prohibition under Article IV, Sec. 3 or any other provisions of the Constitution to prohibit the people from forming an association of new unincorporated states, and just being there is no charter of incorporation of the new states and just what its duties are, i.e., its intents and purposes, a resulting implied charitable trust is formed by operation of law.
[Senator Harkins’ description may be factually correct. Nevertheless, his description is still a bunch of lying, treasonous crap.
Why? Because clearly, the “people” never formed an “association of new unincorporated states”. Don’t believe me. Ask ‘em. You won’t find one man in a thousand that even understands the question, and for every 100 men who understand the question at least 90 would say, Hell no!—we formed no new “association of unincorporated states!”
The current system of “this state” is based on the presumption that “the people” (what people? We the People? Or some other subset? Maybe just 50 or 100 “people”?) formed a “new association of new unincorporated states” without a charter of incorporation, statement of duties and purposes, etc. That’s like saying I am presumed to have built a house without ever buying any land, boards, nails, concrete, bricks, glass or roofing materials. It’s a pure presumption unsupported by any tangible expression of action or intent. The new “association of unincorporated states” is likewise a pure presumption based on the “people’s” conduct of “assenting” to discharging, rather than paying, their debts and “conveying” their “estates” into the “public trust”.
Senator Harkins’ reference to the Article IV Section 3 restriction on the creation of “incorporated States” and assertion that there is no constitutional restriction (at least not at Article 4.3) on the creation of to “unincorporated states” may be a central premise on which the “The State”/“this state” dichotomy is based. He argues that because there is no constitutional prohibition (again, at least not at Art. 4.3) against creating “unincorporated states” that such creation must be lawful. This argument is based on the presumption that Article 4.3 applies to INCORPORATED “States”. In fact, Article 4.3 never uses the term “incorporated” but merely refers to “States”. Thus, Harkins et al are apparently merely presuming that “States” (as used in Art. 4.3) necessarily means “incorporated States”. I doubt that that’s true.
Even if it is true, what exactly do they mean by “incorporated States”? Do they mean States that are corporations? Or do they mean States that are charitable trusts that are “incorporated” or “included” into the perpetual Union styled “The United States of America”.
I doubt that the States of the Union have never been “corporations” in the same sense as GM or IBM. So far as I know, none of these “States” were every registered with an State Secretary of State to “do business” in any State.
The notion that the States were never “incorporated” in the sense that GM & IBM are “incorporated” needs confirmation. But if that’s so, then the only “incorporation” I can see that applies to the “States” is the “inclusion” of the various individual, sovereign “States” as members of and into the perpetual Union. If that were true, then any time you were “within The United States of America,” you could not be “in” or “within” the “unincorporated states” which—by implication of Harkin’s letter—are not “incorporated” into The United States of America. If so, then if you disclaim all of your actions as within The United States of America, the “unincorporated states” would have no claim of venue over you.
Again, Harkins not only alleges that the people formed the new association of new, unincorporated states that have come to supplant or replace the “incorporated States,” but alleges that the people did so without an express charter, or express statement of its duties, intents and purposes. Harkins doesn’t directly say so, but he implies that the people formed these “unincorporated states” by implication of mere use of legal tender/FRNs to discharge their debts.
This implication is probably supported by the statutory definition of FRNs that declares them to be strictly for the use of banks to settle their relative accounts. Thus, if the people use FRNs, they would seem to do so in some private sense and without statutory authority. From this private, unauthorized use of FRNs, the gov-co apparently presumes that “by operation of law,” the people have created an implied charitable trust that operates in some fictional venue since, under Art. 1.10.1, a venue that uses any thing besides gold and silver coin, must be other than on the soil of a State of the Union.
But all of this is nothing but presumptions and none of it can be proven since there are no documents or express acts creating the new “association of unincorporated states”. As such, every bit of the “association of unincorporated states” can probably be defeated by a mere express denial that I am either beneficiary or fiduciary for such “states” and/or “public trust” and/or “implied charitable trust”. That denial might have to be supported by a protest against using FRNs insofar as such use is deemed to create an disability. I.e., “without prejudice, 1-205” (or whatever UCC code applies). If “this state” is an unincorporated, implied charitable trust, there can be no compelled benefits, no compelled beneficiaries, and no involuntary servitude for fiduciaries within a State of the Union.
The whole damned scheme is based on nothing but presumptions and the primary presumptions appears to flow from the use of FRNs without protest and/or the use of a SS account. But we are “virtually” forced to use FRNs because our federal government pulled the gold and silver out of circulation (and then probably sold off our Treasury reserves, besides). Because removal of gold and silver essentially “killed” the States of the Union (or at least their governments), that removal was at least unconstitutional, probably treasonous and arguably an act of war committed by the federales against the States of the Union.
Blaming the “people” for this mess is about as reasonable as blaming my eight grandparents for my last traffic ticket.
Anyone who fully understands and can explain this issue would have a defense that “this state” probably wouldn’t dare challenge in a court before a jury.]
As a result of the foregoing, when you go into court, the judge constructs [construes] a [constructive] trust whereby he takes [silent] judicial notice [of the presumption that you are a beneficiary and/or fiduciary of the “unincorporated, implied charitable trust” and the presumption is deemed a fact until rebutted with evidence] and invokes unjust enrichment on your part.
Consequently there is no Constitutional Law, only the conscience of the masses in the [unincorporated, implied charitable] trust governed by courts of equity ‘whereby all property, real and personal is held in common to everybody in the trust, i.e., every person re-insures each other’s debts and responsibility, in limited liability.
[I believe that alleging that there is “no Constitutional Law” (of the express charitable trust) is a lie. I believe the Constitution is still here, but does not apply to those “in” the “implied charitable trust”—which apparently is presumed to includes all those who make no express declaration to the contrary. Such presumption is just about as irrational and absurd as presuming that everyone is has six toes on his right foot who doesn’t expressly declare that he does not. In the case of presuming everyone to be “in” the “implied charitable trust” is based on the underlying presumption that everyone knows the law, knows when they’ve entered an implied trust relationship, etc..
Such presumptions may be necessary (at least from the point of view of government), but they are fundamentally and obviously false. The people do not understand all, or hardly any, of the law. They wouldn’t know an implied charitable trust if it bit them on ass. They certainly never intended to leave the express charitable trust of the Constitution to enter some imaginary “implied charitable trust” that cannot even be shown to exist except by implication.
More, such presumptions are—or at least give rise to—legal fictions which, by definition, can do no harm. Assuming that we could successfully argue that 1) we had not voluntarily joined the “legal fiction” of “this state”; and 2) the presumption that we had joined was a legal fiction that was stripping us of our God-given, unalienable Rights—then we’d have evidence of a “harm” caused by the legal fiction of “this state”. If there’s any harm, that fiction must be terminated. Fictions can do no harm. Can presumptions—at least those based on legal fictions—be any different?
The allegation that the former “Constitutional Law” has been replaced by “only the conscience of the masses” is too fantastic to be false. Who would dream of making such a statement unless it were true? Truth really is, and probably must be, stranger than fiction.
But what, exactly, is the “conscience of the masses”? Vox populii? How do we measure or discern that “conscience of the masses”? The reference to “masses” clearly implicates the democracy. The “conscience” is probably presumed to be mystically “known” to the elected representatives. (The “unelected” employees of the democracy—including federal judges—could not be presumed to “know” the “conscience of the masses”.) This “conscience of the masses” cannot be stable or set, but is ultimately expressed in a changing, case-by-case basis. Such system would be inherently “private” in nature. Might would make right, and you could do anything you could get away with. Where there is no “law,” there are also no real “rights”—only expectations (at best). Instead, under the “implied, charitable trust” there is no (public) law other than power, popularity and “do what thou wilt”.
If this analysis and description are roughly correct, the “implied charitable trust” is at minimum, atheistic, more probably anti-godly, and arguably Satanic. The word “conscience” is a somewhat confused mix of both heart and mind. The Bible declares that man’s heart is an inherently deceitful and even wicked (or words to that effect). Insofar as the “conscience of the masses” is a reflection of the average “heart” of the people, and that “conscience of the masses” is the north star for values under the implied charitable trust, “this state” is clearly run without deference to the laws of God, except insofar as those godly laws influence the “conscience” of the masses. In other words, God’s law might be followed—but not as “Law,” per se, but rather as a kind of suggestion or recommendation that most people accept, but could also reject at any moment.
What’s all this mean?
It means that the “implied charitable trust” and “this state” are vulnerable to challenge under the 1st Amendment and/or TexCon provisos that secure our “freedom of religion” and prohibit the “establishment of religion”. The republican form of government certainly recognized God’s law because it started with the premise of God-given, unalienable Rights.
In the Senator’s phrase, “whereby all property, real and personal is held in common to everybody in the trust, i.e., every person re-insures each other’s debts and responsibility, in limited liability,” the word “whereby” refers back to the “conscience of the masses”. Thus, the “conscience of the masses” lays the foundation for “holding” that all property is owned in common.
First, the idea that the “conscience of the masses” believes that all property is “held in common” is absurd and a lie. There’s not one man in 100 who believes that he shares or should share ownership of his car, his home, his income, his guns, his plasma TV and his collection of Playboy magazines with anyone other than himself. And then you get into the concept of who “owns” your kids. Who would agree that your children are “held in common” with the rest of the “masses”? How can the “conscience of the masses” be said to agree that there is no private property, when virtually everyone believes consciously that there is? It’s not possible; it’s a lie. More, the “conscience of the masses” is not only an ungodly term, but arguably a legal fiction that, by definition, can do no harm.
And then there’s the word “held” in Senator Harkins’ phrase “whereby all property, real and personal is held in common to everybody in the trust, i.e., every person re-insures each other’s debts and responsibility, in limited liability”—the word “held” is ambiguous. Does “held” mean that I “hold” my computer, and you “hold” your car, and the guy across the street “holds” his house in the sense of beneficiaries “holding” or “possessing” trust property? Or does “held” mean “determined” in the sense that a judge “holds” that the defendant has no right to habeas corpus or “holds” that the plaintiff is entitled to receive $20,000. In essence, who is doing the “holding”? Each individual property “holder”? Or the government “holding” that we are all little more than sharecroppers? And what is being “held”: individual items of property or conclusions and presumptions?
Next, note that according to Senator Harkins’ text (“all property, real and personal is held in common to everybody in the trust”) is also somewhat ambiguous as to the limits of its application. I first take notice of the phrase “in the trust” and conclude that the entire liability to “holding” your property in common with everyone else is limited to those that are “in the trust”. Ergo, if you are not a grantor, beneficiary and/or fiduciary “in the (implied charitable) trust,” you could own your own property. But then I see the word “all” referencing property and recall that there is a Senate report (maybe on Emergency War Powers?) that declares all property to be held by the United States. Is it possible that “all property” is now in the hands of “this state” and if you are not “in this state” that you can’t “own” or “hold” ANY property??
If the implied trust were acting on the principle that it held ALL property, that premise would be based on the use of FRNs—but would probably be limited to holding “legal title” to all property purchased with FRNs rather than holding perfect (legal + equitable) title. But even then, the implied trust would be acting on the PRESUMPTION that we intentionally donated or granted our property into the implied charitable trust by virtue of the mere conduct of using FRNs and/or by taking the SSN. That presumption is false. If I haven’t intentionally granted my property into the implied charitable trust, government’s presumption to the contrary would constitute a “taking” if government persisted in claiming my property even after I expressly denied having voluntarily consented to such donation.
Harkins asserts that “all property, real and personal is held in common to everybody in the trust, i.e., every person re-insures each other’s debts and responsibility, in limited liability.”
First, every member of the implied charitable trust is a “person” (a capacity or standing that exists in relation to other persons or entities) rather than a “man . . . at arm’s length” who stands independent of all fiduciary relationships. Note also that these “persons” might be legal fictions like “ALFRED ADASK,” “JOE SMITH” and “JOHN DOE”.
Second, note that every member of the implied charitable trust is deemed to “re-insure” (rather than “insure”) each other’s “debts”. If everyone else is “re-insuring” my original debts, that implies that my original debts are, initially, also an act of “insurance”. I (or perhaps “ADASK”) provide the preliminary “insurance” on each of my (its) original “debts”; the rest of the implied member-persons of the “implied charitable trust” are presumed and/or “held” to provide some secondary “re-insurance” of “my” (“ADASK’s”?) original debt.
Terry Self broke his back, was declared 100% disabled, and was subsequently declared (by SSA?) to be “uninsurable” and has since come to the conclusion that he’s thereby regained his sovereignty. By being “uninsurable,” it appears that he can’t be ticketed, sued, . . . a bunch of strange things seem to happen.
Note also that all “insurance” is deemed to be “maritime”. Thus, if all of our debts/transaction were acts of “insurance,” all of those debts/transactions would implicate maritime and/or admiralty jurisdiction.
How could every “debt” be deemed an act of “insurance”? A: Given that these debts aren’t actually paid with specie but are merely discharged with legal tender/FRNs, then when I make a purchase with FRNs, I haven’t actually “paid” my debt, but only “discharged” my debt with a “promise to pay” at some future date. That “promise”—backed by my signature—would apparently constitute an act of “insurance”. My promise that the seller would one day actually be “paid” would be an act of “insurance”.
Of course, that promise to pay is false. The seller will never be paid, but that’s probably OK since (under the unstated terms of the implied charitable trust) he doesn’t really “own” the property he’s purporting to “sell” anyway. This whole concept becomes irrational to the point of madness. If my analysis is correct, in a typical transaction, I am purporting to “pay” for something that I can’t own to a seller who didn’t own whatever I purchased in the first place. If I were reading Harkins’ letter and if I didn’t think that my analysis was at least semi-logical, I’d dismiss my conclusions as impossible. But in the world and circumstances in which we live, the “impossible” and the “insane” would seem to be the “normal”.
Note that two frauds are taking place: First, the seller purports to hold legal and equitable title to whatever property I might seek to buy; second, the “buyer” purports to pay for the title to such property. In fact, the “seller” never had clear title to whatever is being sold; there was no “exchange”; instead, the seller merely transferred the property from one beneficiary (?) (fiduciary?) to another. Second, the buyer’s promise to pay is a lie. The debt will never be paid. It will only be, at best, discharged.
Both parties to the transaction are engaged in something very akin to fraud—except both sides typically have no idea that what they’re doing is false and therefore there is normally no requisite intent. However, in some transactions, the requisite intent is probably present. Say you’re dealing with a banker or other financial “expert”; he knows or should know that the “promises to pay” are false and impossible. And I’m not just talking about your promise to repay a loan. I’m also talking about the bank’s promise to “pay interest” on your deposits, etc. That’s fraud.
Insofar as every transaction where one merely “discharges” one’s debt is an act of “insurance,” all such transactions might be subject to challenge under a sophisticated application of the laws of “insurance fraud”.
This “insurance” process of discharging debts becomes even more complicated by the assertion that each original debt/discharge/insured-transaction is subsequently “re-insured” by everyone else. Apparently, everyone else “in the trust” is at least a co-insurer of my “debts” and more probably a kind of surety for my debts.
How could this be? I don’t know, but I’d bet that the “re-insurer” status attaches by means of the SSN. We contribute to SS, but our contributions don’t go into our “individual accounts”. The currency that you contributed into SS in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, has not been in a separate account that is accessible only by you. All of your contributions were spent just as fast as you “paid” them, and your only hope of receiving some compensation for your contributions during your retirement rests on the expectation that some other generation of your grandchildren will merrily pay through the nose to support you old folks in your “golden years”.
There is something in that expectation that smacks of “re-insurance”. The SSA has promised/insured that those who hold SSNs will be provided for in their old age. That SSA promise/insurance has been reinsured by all the subsequent generations of SSN-holders who re-promise/re-insure to provide for their grandparents’ retirement. I can’t put my finger on it just yet, but there is something about SS that smells of “re-insurance”.
But I could be wrong. SS was originally promoted to the “public” as old-age “insurance”. The USSC eventually declared that reference to “insurance” to be false. That probably means that SS is no longer deemed some sort of “insurance” enterprise—but does that necessarily mean that SS couldn’t be a “re-insurance” enterprise??
I’ll also bet that insofar as we are all “held” to be issuing “insurance” and then “re-insuring” each other, we probably lack standing at law to sue our co-insurers. If we can sue each other, the process is probably not a simple plaintiff v defendant action, but might some sort of cross-claim or cross-action, or some such wherein we sue “co-defendants” or even “co-plaintiffs”.
Another chink in the “implied charitable trust’s” armor might be the individual purchaser’s act of “issuing insurance”. If all of our “debts” are discharged by means of FRNs, and if such “discharge” constitutes only a “promise to pay” (not payment),a and IF such “promise to pay” is a kind of insurance, who, exactly, is licensed to issue insurance “in this state”? I suspect that the power to issue insurance is restricted and requires some sort of license. If that’s true, then—unless you have such “license” to issue insurance—it would appear that the “masses” can’t lawfully “discharge”/“insure” their debts with FRNs and/or their signatures.
I don’t know much about insurance, but if Senator Harkins reference to “re-insurance” is correct, and if issuing insurance requires a license, then the transactions in the “implied charitable trust” should be vulnerable to challenge since the “buyer” (who insured payment with FRNs and/or his signature) has no license to issue insurance.
But that possibility is based on my presumption that the “purchaser” is the person who “insures” the original transaction with his signature. But what if the purchase is “insured” by the Federal Reserve System and/or the persons who’ve signed their names to the FRNs or credit used in each transaction. Clearly, 99.9% of the “masses” have no license to issue insurance, but perhaps the “insurance” is issued by the Federal Reserve. Perhaps the purchaser is the “re-insurer” or at least first “re-insurer”.
That makes some sense since “payment” ultimately depends on an exchange of “legal title” (not “discharge” and mere transfer of equitable title). As I understand legal tender, because the Federal Reserve loans its FRNs and credit to the banks, etc., the Federal Reserve should thus retain legal title to those notes and credit until that original loan is actually repaid. Those of us who have FRNs (that were loaned into circulation) in our pockets only have equitable title to those Notes and therefore can only use such Notes to purchase equitable title to property. Legal title to the Notes should remain with the Federal Reserve until the original loan that placed the particular FRN in circulation is actually repaid. But given that there’s little or no gold or silver coin in circulation, it’s virtually impossible to ever truly repay such loans, so the Federal Reserve will retain legal title forever.
I therefore conclude that if “payment” involves the exchange of legal title, and only the Federal Reserve has legal title to our FRNs (promises to pay), then only the Federal Reserve has capacity to actually “pay” those “debts” that have been discharged/insured with FRNs. That implies that only the Federal Reserve could “insure” the original promises to pay that’s inherent in every FRN-based transaction, and therefore that the Federal Reserve must be one of the “insurers” for a transaction, and is probably the original “insurer”.
This implies that the Federal Reserve System might be properly understood to be an insurance company.
Ooooh. But if so, the Federal Reserve’s insurance would be entirely based on fraud since there is no intent and no way to ever actually “pay” the debts denominated in and discharged with FRNs. If so, we could probably sue the Federal Reserve for “insurance fraud”—except for one thing: we’ve “voluntarily” participated in every FRN-based transaction and are thus operating with “unclean hands” ourselves and thus without standing to sue the Federal Reserve.
Unless we expressly protested each transaction denominated in FRNs.
If we protested the use of FRNs and excused our use as based on necessity, no alternative, etc., we might be able to escape the “unclean hands” status and therefore have standing to sue the Federal Reserve for “payment” of whatever debts we might have received (as “sellers”) and/or for legal title to whatever property we might have purchased as “buyers”.
Harkins asserts that “all property, real and personal is held in common to everybody in the trust, i.e., every person re-insures each other’s debts and responsibility, in limited liability.”
[I’m not sure what he means by “limited liability”. Limited to what? Limited to who? Limited only to the “discharged” amount? Not the full debt at law??]
In other words, by operation of law [implied trust obligations construed into a constructive trust], the people have formed new unincorporated states that operate outside the Constitution under their right to contract and convey their property as a gift in trust, thereby creating relative rights instead of absolute rights. As stated earlier, being there is no charter of incorporation and just what its duties and jurisdiction consist of, this public trust of unincorporated states reverts back to the Articles of Confederation because, under the Articles, taxation and commerce were and are under the control of the states [Actually, States of the Union; not “implied” states.] and outside the control of the federal Government.
[Holy cow. That last single sentence is so fantastic that it is still hard for me to believe in its entirety. I can believe almost all of it, except “reverts back to the Articles of Confederation”. It’s not impossible, but it’s hard to believe.
If we are back under the Articles, then we must also be back under the Constitutions of the States of the Union and the concept of “States rights” is once again valid. I don’t believe that’s the case. If anything, we’d have more freedom under the Articles than under the Constitution (especially, including the 14th). How could we back under any system of government that didn’t rely on the 14th Amendment?
On the other hand, I’ve argued that under this “privatized” system of “this state,” we arguably have more freedom today than at almost any other time under the federal Constitution. I’ve argued that if the States are insolvent and non-functional due to the loss of gold/silver coin (Art. 1.10.1) and in the resulting “void” all of the powers previously exercised by the States of the Unions would default back to the People. I’ve argued that we are sovereigns; I’ve argued that gov-co must presume use to be sovereigns since the federales and/or “this state” seem to need our consent (or at least assent) to proceed against us.
While my notions on sovereignty may be debatable, I remain convinced that the States of the Union have been neutered by the loss of gold and silver coin under Artcle 1.10.1. Everything I’ve seen and all logic that I can summon supports the conclusion that the governments of the States of the Union are no longer functioning beyond a caretaker capacity; they are virtual ghost towns.
Taking the loss of the States of the Union as a “cornerstone” premise, Senator Harkins’ claims about the Articles of Confederation and remaining “power of the states” to tax, seem impossible. Harkins could be right, but I can’t yet see it. As always, I stand to be corrected, but I cannot agree with the Articles assertion at this time. I believe that either Harkins was mistaken or Harkins was lying in his reference to the Articles.
On the other hand, Harkins’ statement that, “In other words, by operation of law, the people have formed new unincorporated states that operate outside the Constitution under their right to contract and convey their property as a gift in trust, thereby creating relative rights instead of absolute rights” impresses me as pretty close to true.
Thus, the IR Code is not under control of Congress’ general powers, but rather its authority lies under local law which is state law under the Erie RR doctrine. The Articles were in force from March 1781 to march 1789. They were never abolished, but discredited by 1786, thus not being incorporated into the Constitution. [The Articles were never “discredited” in any legal sense, and there was no need for them to be “incorporated” into the Constitution. The Articles are one of four documents (DOI, Articles, NW Ordinance, Constitution) that comprise the Organic Law of The United States of America to this day.] Most authorities of that time agree that had it not been for the Articles of Confederation, our Constitutional Republic would not have survived [Which “Constitutional Republic” is that? The federal government? I could be wrong, but so far as I know, there was no “constitutional republic” under the Articles, so how did the Articles help it survive?], but taxation and commerce being under control of the states [under the Articles] created major problems as we are witnessing today under local law. [I can see that there might be “major commerce problems” under “this state,” but I don’t see any “major taxation problems”. Taxes are a pain in the butt, but the system—no matter how corrupt or incomprehensible–seems to run without too much trouble.] Erie [Erie R. Co. v Tomkins, 304 US 64 A.D. 1938] held that the law of the state [Probably The State, remotely, “this state”. Arguably, the lex loci which might be determined/chosen by the parties.] shall apply in the absence of the Constitution or Acts of Congress. [Conversely, IF Harkin’s description of Erie is correct, then if the Constitution or Acts of Congress apply and are “present,” the “state” law will not apply. Again, IF Harkins’ description of Erie is correct, the constitutions and laws of the “states” would be subservient and secondary to the federal Constitution and to federal Statutes. This analysis suggests that Erie doesn’t empower the “states,” but instead diminishes them from a status at least originally superior to the federal Constitution and federal statutes to a clearly inferior status.]
First Erie does not say the incorporated State, but the unincorporated state, [In fact, the word “incorporate” occurs only once in Erie v Tompkins: “Knowing that such a contract would be void under the common law of Kentucky, it was arranged that the Brown & Yellow reincorporate under the law of Tennessee, and that the contract with the railroad should be executed there.” Erie does not “say” the either “incorporated” or “unincorporated” with respect to any State or state. Harkins’ statement might be intended as an inference, but it is technically incorrect.] Secondly, Erie does not differentiate between foreign or domestic commerce, nor does it differentiate between local or general Acts of Congress. [So what? Does Erie apply to both forms of commerce, or only one? A “local” act of Congress sounds like something that applies only to specific places, territories, D.C., etc., but not the entire nation.] I go ballistic when I hear folks say it’s the incorporated States that are doing us in. Go to your state constitution and check to see if the state boundary lines are there, OH! You say, they are not there. Well then, how can the incorporated State or States be doing us in when there is no boundary Lines drawn between the various general powers over the people and the U.S. Supreme Court has stated this many time over.
[I’m not convinced that the last text that I’ve italicized was written by Harkins. The language sounds something less than “senatorial”.
Nevertheless, the author seems to say that without reference to express “boundaries,” we can’t have “States” that separate us from the federal government. I.e., without “boundaries,” the States degenerate into territories. This, in turn implies that any reference to a State of the Union must be supported by some express declaration of that State’s boundaries. A State without boundaries is not a “State”?
Nevertheless, the author seems to declare clearly that the “incorporated” “States” are the de jure, while the de facto “states” are “unincorporated”. However, he’s not clearly using the terms “incorporated” and “unincorporated” in the sense that GM and IBM are “incorporated”. He complains that some people (“patriots”?) are complaining about the “incorporated” de facto “states”—but those complaints presume the de facto “states” to be incorporated in the sense of being legal fictions. The author seems to use “incorporated” and “unincorporated” to refer to States that “incorporated” into the Union in the sense of being “included” while the “states” that “unincorporated” are “un-included” in the Union.]
The purpose of the personal income tax is to tax those who want government acting under local law (public policy) to take care of them, which unfortunately is what most of the people want and expect and therein lies the major problem. Anyhow, silence is consent, therefore you are required to file tax returns and share your wealth with the undesirables, that is, unless you use the Foreign Sovereign immunities Act, 28 USC 1502-1611, passed in 1976 in order to offer to those who are dissatisfied with public policy, a statutory remedy to the Constitution under Article III. Your [as citizens of the United States?] access to the [federal] Constitution runs directly through the FSIA in every area in dealing with government, federa!, state, or local. [FSIA is the statutory alternative to “U.S. citizenship”?]
In short, the FSIA codified the era of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1 (1842-1938) whereby a jury trial can now be demanded, if desired, in State court on any statutory issue covered by the FSIA against federal, state, or local government. Congress specifically stated that the FSIA must be interpreted, by statutory remedy in an Article III court regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff under international law outside of the realm of equity, Erie, Title 42, and other public policy. FSIA also, waives sovereign immunity for commercial activities of state and federal governments which consists of about 90% of government activity. In summation, arguing the Internal Revenue Code is an effort in futility.
Letter with my commentary from June A.D. 2007:
SENATOR TOM HARKINS (Iowa) – IRS KNOWLEDGE
Although the IR Code is used as the basis for the so called income tax, the personal income tax does not derive its authority from the 16th Amendment, Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR, or any other constitutional or federal provision, as those authorities fell with the loss of our national money standard in 1933.
Since 1933, the people have formed new a new unincorporated United States in trust by their silence in accepting the loss of their ability for paying their debts at law. In other words, the suspension of our national money standard created a void in the law.
Consequently, a resulting or implied trust rushed in [under “emergency,” perhaps—but without other express, constitutional or perhaps even political authority] to fill the void. In a resulting or implied trust, there are not terms of how and who is to administer the terms of the trust, [Rule by man (in equity) rather than rule by law.] therefore you cannot put the blame on anyone besides the people for letting the trust be established.
[Senator Harkins’ insistence that no one “besides the people” can be “blamed” for the existence of this implied trust seemingly exonerates the government (and especially Senators, hmm?) from liability for subjecting the people to the same sort of tyranny as was originally described in the Declaration of Independence as “obstruct[ing] the administration of justice [at law],”
The fact that an implied trust “rushed in” does not show or even suggest that such trust had “authority” to “rush”. The fact that the implied trust “rushed in” almost certainly implies that it “rushed” without authority.
Without authority, one’s participation in a trust must be voluntary. You must presumably have volunteered to act as either a beneficiary or a fiduciary in this implied trust. Alternatively, “ALFRED ADASK” may be the persistent beneficiary of this brave new trust, and “Alfred Adask” might be presumed to be the persistent fiduciary (for “ADASK” and for the trust, itself).
The “people” may be “to blame” for “letting” (permitting) the trust to be established, this blame is based on the presumption that the “people” have a clue or could be held responsible for having a clue as to the trust’s creation or even existence. There is law that presumes all are expected to recognize a trust relationship when they see it and thus, silence is presumed to signify their acceptance of the trust relationship and their attendant duties as fiduciaries.
Clearly, not one man in 1,000 even knows what a trust is, let alone is capable of recognizing a trust relationship when he sees one. Nevertheless, the law that holds all men liable for recognizing—without notice or verbal clue–an otherwise “invisible” trust relationship is absurd, tyrannical and lays the foundation for an “invisible” oppression. That “law” that holds all men liable for recognizing a trust relationship without express notice (and thus in violation of procedural due process) must be found, studied and attacked.
I am particularly interested in the age of this law (or possible maxim). Is this “law” relatively recent, or is this a principle/maxim that goes back several centuries?
The great vulnerability of this “rushing implied trust,” is that the fiduciaries must assume their obligations voluntarily and even the beneficiaries cannot be compelled to accept benefits and/or status as beneficiaries. There may truly be an “implied trust,” but no one can be forced into the servitude of fiduciary without their consent (at least not within the boundaries of The United States of America).
Thus, once you learn to recognize the “implied, invisible trust,” and expressly and properly refuse to voluntarily assume the role of fiduciary, you apparently become free. Perhaps totally free.
Senator Harkins’ statement that no one “besides the people” can be “blamed” for “letting” the implied trust to have been “established” implies that the “people” are probably the presumptive grantors of the trust. Clearly, a fiduciary cannot control, let, allow or permit whether a trust is established. An fiduciary can consent to continue serving as a fiduciary or resign his office, but a fiduciary cannot control whether a trust is allowed to exist or not. Similarly, a beneficiary may consent to continue as beneficiary or resign from that office, but cannot unilaterally determine whether a trust is allowed to be established. The only party to a trust that can seemingly be held accountable for its establishment is the grantor.
Thus, if Senator Harkins is correct in declaring that only the “people” can be “blamed” for establishing the implied trust, then I’m led to conclude that the “people” must be deemed to be the original “implied” grantors of the implied trust. This whole “invisible, implied trust” scheme is a bunch of crap, of course, but it the underlying “logic” and “authority” must be analyzed so as to launch an effective counter-attack.
If it were true that the “people” are deemed to have “let,” permitted and thus granted the implied trust into existence, how did those same “people” become fiduciaries for that implied trust? Why didn’t they become beneficiaries?
I’ll bet that we are all presumed to have been “born” (or perhaps even “created”) as beneficiaries of the implied trust. However, once we take a SSN or voters registration, or any other symbol of status as “citizen of the United States [federal government]” who is therefore “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” etc., we probably forfeit our status as “beneficiary” and “voluntary” become fiduciaries.
One way or another, the “people” who are “blamed” for establishing/granting the “implied trust” are tricked or presumed into assuming the role of fiduciary (or trustee) in an implied trust that they don’t even know exists.
But if the “people” granted this implied trust and if the “people” (unwittingly) assumed the office of “fiduciary” in this implied trust, who/what is the beneficiary? And which “people” and/or “people” are we talking about? The people of the singular “United States” or the people of the several “United States” (aka “The United States of America”)?
I am reminded of Jimmie L. Benton, the black federal immigrations court judge who was arrested, jailed over night, and sue for and collected $53,000. He claimed himself to be a “Citizen of the United States of America”. I am about 98% certain that all “citizens of the United States”/(federal government) are presumed to have voluntarily assumed the office of fiduciaries in this brave new implied trust. Is it possible that “Citizens of The United States of America” and/or “The United States of America” are deemed to be the beneficiaries of this implied trust?
It seems certain that so long as we avoid the designation “citizen of the [singular] United States,” we may be able to avoid the role of fiduciary in the implied trust. Avoiding that servitude is certainly good but, in theory, doing so only removes us as fiduciaries and thus participants in the implied trust. Once we effectively deny our role as “citizens [employees/fiduciaries] of the United State [federal government],” we may become “invisible” to the trust administrators and thus technically “free” from the trust’s obligations and administrative “laws,” but we are still left in a condition of social “isolation” wherein we can’t be subjected to the trust’s obligations, but neither can we invoke the trust’s powers and/or benefits.
The brass ring in this situation may be to both 1) disclaim your status as “citizen of the United States” (fiduciary); and 2) claim your status as “Citizen of the United States of America” (beneficiary).
We probably can’t sue the implied trust (“United States”?) or its agents and/or fiduciaries, unless we do so in the status of beneficiary of that very trust. The previous conjecture suggests that the status of beneficiary of the implied trust might be reserved exclusively for the “Citizens of The United States of America”. If so, in order to sue the bastards, we must establish 1) that we are not fiduciaries (citizens of the United States); and 2) are beneficiaries (citizens of The United States of America)—or something along those lines.
Who would normally be a “citizen of The United States of America”? Children. Maybe the elderly. Perhaps the disabled and/or uninsurable. Maybe the people/children of God.
Insofar as you take insurance you “trust in man” rather than God. Insofar as you take insurance, you did “choose this day” to serve Mammon rather than God.
Wouldn’t that be something, if the “children of God” were the true beneficiaries of the new-and-improved implied trust. I wouldn’t bet that’s necessarily true, but it’s not impossible.
One puzzlement in all this is how our status as fiduciaries for the government/implied trust carries over into our lawsuits. As fiduciaries, we can’t sue the government/implied trust. Makes perfect sense. As fiduciaries, we might sue other fiduciaries (government employees and agents) in an administrative proceeding.
But I’ve thought for years that the plaintiff in any case is the implied beneficiary in an implied trust wherein the defendant is deemed to be the implied fiduciary. Still makes sense. When we sue the government, we are deemed to be fiduciaries for the government by virtue of our SSN, DL, bank account signature card, birth certificate, residential address, voters registration, and who knows what else. But when we sue another “private party” we sue without any relationship to the government’s implied trust and instead sue based on a “private” implied trust that is alleged/implied to exist strictly between the two litigants.
In any case, if our relationship (as citizens of the United States) to the government is presumed to be that of fiduciaries and our relationship as defendants to plaintiffs in private lawsuits is likewise presumed to be that of fiduciaries, if you are expressly acting “at arm’s length,” you have expressly denied that you are a voluntary fiduciary for any “implied trust”. Once you expressly deny that you are fiduciary, they must prove the contrary. That means they must not merely prove that you assumed the status of citizen of the United States, or took a SSN, etc., but that you did so knowing that such status was deemed to be the assumption of the role of fiduciary, and more that you assumed that fiduciary role voluntarily.
Under the 13th Amendment, if you didn’t voluntarily assume that servitude, that servitude cannot be enforced.
More, assuming that “if you ‘volunteered’ in, you can ‘volunteer’ out,” then even if I did volunteer in when I signed up for So-So Security or took a voters registration, etc., I can still volunteer out, any time I please. Once I quit the fiduciary role, they have no power to “administer” against me, and little power to even sue me at law.
So long as you act “at arm’s length,” it appears that you may be acting within this “void in the law”? Are you therefore free (and hopefully self-governing) within the void?
Nevertheless, the idea that only the “people” are to be “blamed” for the new implied trust is self-serving, senatorial crap. The people were never given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. I’ll bet that the gov-co did give some sort of “notice,” but that the notice was carefully crafted as to depend on the people’s ignorance and give only a notice that was calculated to be misunderstood and ignored. If such notice was given, it was over 70 years ago. Why hasn’t any politician since then given additional notice? Because the whole damn scheme is a scam. The whole thing is a conspiracy.
The government had a fiduciary obligation to the people under the Constitution of the USA to inform us that our government was being overthrown by legal sophistry; that it was presumed that we approved of this overthrow because we did not expressly protest.
But this overthrow of the original trust relationship we’d established under the Constitution could not be achieved with our mere “assent,” but instead required our express consent. More, there is no authority in the Constitution for this overthrow and the only basis on which the overthrow can be countenanced is the doctrine of “emergency”. (I.e., in an “emergency,” the laws are suspended and you do whatever you have to do to survive.)
We have now been consistently subject to one or more national emergencies since A.D. 1933. I’ll bet that it’s under the pretext of these seemingly endless emergencies, that the implied trust has “rushed in” to fill the “void” that was created when the “law” was suspended by the loss of our constitutional money.
This suggests that any attempt to sue or defend against the gov-co should include an express denial that there is any emergency. The absence of “emergency” might be signaled by flying a flag of peace.
In the end, the idea that no one but the “people” can be “blamed” for the creation of this new trust is probably a very important and reassuring lie for Senator Harkins in that it shields the government officers (like Senators) from a sense of personal responsibility for the treason that’s been perpetrated on the American people.
How can the people be blamed when they had no understanding of what was happening? How can the people be “blamed” based on their silence (which was and is based on their ignorance)? And how can some of “people” who happen to be Senators, Representatives and Presidents and DO UNDERSTAND what’s happening, claim any immunity from this “blame”?
But even if Senator Harkins is arguably right to blame the people (other than the people in government) for the creation (by means of silence) of this new “charitable trust,” who is responsible for abandoning the original charitable trust called the Constitution? Why aren’t ALL modern Senators, Representatives, Supreme Court justices and Presidents responsible for the breach of their fiduciary obligations as officers of the original charitable trust?
This whole thing is based on the scam of public “silence”.
The argument that the people can be held guilty for the silence is particularly absurd given that our State and federal constitutions were created by means of the public’s VOICE. Our federal Constitution was created by means of public conventions within each of the several States wherein the people spoke, listened, and eventually voted out loud to support or reject the proposed Constitution. Our state and federal constitutions were subsequently amended by means of the people’s VOICE.
How is it that the constitutions we recognize are based on our express word, and the “constitution” that “this state” enforces against us are based on our silence?
More, what act of creation was ever achieved by silence or some other failure to act? Can we create a clay pot, an automobile or even a baby by doing absolutely nothing? All creations, from books, inventions, homes, skyscrapers, space craft, and children are all the result of works, usually words, and never by silence and inaction.
From a spiritual perspective, we can look to story of creation in the first chapter of Genesis. According to Genesis, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. . . . Then God said, “let there be light”; and there was light. . . . Then God said, “Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters.” Thus, God made (created) the firmament . . . .” And so it goes for the six days of creation.
Thus, even God’s acts of creation are achieve by means of the spoken word. So far as I know, God created nothing by His silence.
If that’s so, what can we say is the source and/or “authority” behind a creation achieved by means of silence? Certainly not God. If not God, then who?
Is Satan ultimately the source of the laws to which the people are presumed to be subject based in their SILENCE?
But there is possible good news. If we got into this mess by means of our silence, we can probably get out by merely learning to speak up. We’ll have to learn what to say. And we’ll have to learn when to say it, and/or to whom we must speak. But if we are subjected to bondage by our silence got us in, then we can be freed by the Word.
And there’s another point: The first charitable trusts (our state and federal constitutions) are at least partially instituted for religious purposes.
The Declaration of Independence declares that the primary duty of the “governments among men” is to secure to each man his God-given, unalienable Rights.
It is certainly arguable that the perpetual Union created by the Articles of the Confederation embraced the religious principles advance by the DOI and the States created by that Declaration.
The Preamble to the federal Constitution declares one of its purposes to “secure the Blessings of Liberty”. The word “Blessings” clearly implicates God, and the “Blessings of Liberty” is certainly synonymous with the “unalienable Right” to “Liberty” declared in the DOI.
The preambles of virtually every constitution for every state in the Union begin with some reference to God’s supreme authority and/or blessings. For example, the Preamble to the Constitution of The State of Texas reads, “Humbly invoking the blessings of Almighty God, the people of the State of Texas, do ordain and establish this Constitution.” In other words, we the people of the State of Texas did ordain and establish our State Constitution based on the authority given us as a blessing of God. Insofar as the ultimate authority for all of the statutory laws of Texas flow from the State’s Constitution, and insofar as that State Constitution is based on God’s authority, then—at bottom—the authority for all lawful, de jure Government within the borders of the State of Texas is God and His Laws and Blessings.
Why is this important? Because insofar as the “new-and-improved” de facto government is based on our silent assent to a NEW “charitable trust,” that NEW charitable trust is ungodly, based on religious principles contrary to our original charitable trust/Constitution, and thus an attempt by the de facto government to impose the “establishment of religion” upon the people. That’s a No-No prohibited by the First Amendment to the federal Constitution, and arguably contrary to one of more of the following sections of the Texas Constitution: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.19, 1.20, 1.22, etc.
In other words, we have an absolute objection to the de facto based on our “freedom of religion”.]
“The United States Government may be the trustee of a charitable trust,” Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163: 27 L.Ed. 397,
[Which “United States Government”—de jure or de facto? The fact that the Government “may” be the trustee does not mean that it necessarily is or must be the trustee in a particular trust. Becoming a “trustee” is a purely voluntary and presumably “discretionary” act. The US Government could agree to voluntarily serve as trustee in the case of Jones vs Adask, but might refuse to volunteer to serve as trustee in the case of Adask v. Dallas County. I’ll bet you that this capacity to voluntarily consent to serve (or not) as trustee over a particular implied trues might explain the rationale for the Supreme Court refusing to hear certain cases. If the case were initiated as a private implied trust between the two litigants, the SC would have the “discretion” to voluntarily consent to act as fiduciary to settle the case or decline that office. The only way to force the SC to hear a case might be to make sure that the grounds were based on the Constitution and then expressly invoke the courts’ fiduciary obligations as officers under that Constitution to secure your rights under the Constitution.]
and further; The United States or a state [Union or territorial?] has capacity to take and hold property [as trustee?] upon a [implied?] charitable trust, but in absence of a statute otherwise providing, the charitable trust is unenforceable against the United States or a state.” [That’s probably bullcrap. Either the courts have mandated and sanctified a violation a fundamental principle of trusts (that the trustees are liable to the beneficiaries), or the word “unenforceable” only applies to other “trustees” (citizens of the United States) but not to beneficiaries (Citizens of The United States of America?). If it were true that no one, neither trustees or beneficiaries could sue the United States as trustee over this implied trust, then we wouldn’t have an irrevocable trust, we probably wouldn’t have any trust at all, we’d have a tyranny where government was the absolute sovereign and the people were reduced to chattle/fiduciaries. ]
In other words, the code does not define who is required to file and what the terms are, but when you use the IR Code [private law? Not Title 26?] as your argument [legal theory, private law without public authority; “argument” is “private law”?], you admit to conveying your estate to the public trust [Can’t be. You do not “admit” because clearly you had no such intent. However, by using/relying on the IRC, you apparently give them grounds to PRESUME that you have “coveyed” (donated?) your estate into the public trust. Does this imply that by relying on private law rather than public law, you are presumed to have abandoned your status and claims as beneficiary under the Constitution and public law and instead implicitly agreed to be act as a fiduciary subject to some other “implied trust” called the “public trust”? Alternatively, use of the IRC (private law?) may imply that you’ve abandoned your position as beneficiary of the “public trust” under the Constitution and become a trustee under that trust. I.e., your failure to rely in the Public Law (Constitution, Statutes at Large or perhaps even common law? Which is for beneficiaries??) and instead rely on a private (IRC) or even public (Title 26) “code” (which is for fiduciaries/trustees??), you allow them to presume that you have voluntarily assumed the servitude of fiduciary for “this state”??], thus all your arguments [private legal theories] have little or no merit [merit = (public/mandatory) authority?].
It then is a constant battle finding niches in the code which the IRS eventually overcomes and it comes down to how much you owe and when you are going to pay. [Close, but not exactly. Once you accept the existence and authority of the “implied trust” by relying on the IRC, then you are assumed to be the fiduciary, and then you’ll be elevated to the status of trustee and/or surety for the defendant, and then—once you’ve unwittingly consented to those servitudes—the only issue will be performance: how much can you pay, and when can you pay it? The IRS ultimately wins the battle if you are engaged in a “constant battle finding niches in the code” since that reliance on the Code proves you’re a fiduciary for the US and/or its agent IRS. Once you are clearly shown to be a fiduciary, you’re finished; the only issues are “how much can you pay and when can you pay it.” Implication: Anyone who tries to fight the IRS by relying on the IRC is going to lose. Fiduciaries can’t win. Ever. Only beneficiaries have rights, only beneficiaries can win. If use of the IRC proves you’re a fiduciary for the US, then that use guarantees that you will lose (unless the IRS has, itself, violated the rules of the IRC). Implication: If you want to beat the IRS, you must find the grounds for your defense outside the IRC.]
In the mean time, you cannot own anything because they put a lien on it and it is hell getting rid of the lien.
You must also remember that you are also considered a beneficiary to the trust and as such, unjust enrichment comes into play.
[Here, I disagree. Unless Senator Harkins is talking about two separate trusts, you cannot be both beneficiary and fiduciary for the same implied trust. If that were true, the trust would be executed and cease to exist. My understanding of unjust enrichment is that it applies exclusively or at least primarily to fiduciaries. So far as I can recall, this is the first time I’ve ever heard of “unjust enrichment” being applied to a beneficiary. For me, this is a very critical point; either he or I am making a very fundamental error.
I’m only guessing, but I suspect that Senator Harkins meant to write “fiduciary” and/or “trustee” where he wrote “beneficiary”. I suspect that, after declaring that the United States Government “may be a trustee for a charitable trust,” he meant to add that the people can also (in addition to the US Government) be “considered to be trustees” (rather than beneficiaries) for that same charitable trust.
Again, one of us is making a very serious mistake. ]
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution states: “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State [of the Union] shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State [of the Union] nor any State [of the Union] be formed by the Junction of two or more States [of the Union], or Parts of States [of the Union], without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States [of the Union] concerned as well as of the Congress.”
Article IV, Sec. 3 clearly states that in order to establish new incorporated States [of the Union] under the Constitution, the legislatures and Congress must follow the Constitutional rules. But, being there is no prohibition under Article IV, Sec. 3 or any other provisions of the Constitution to prohibit the people from forming an association of new unincorporated states [that are not of the Union. People have a First Amendment right of “assembly” which lays the foundation for “association”. But the right of assembly and association is voluntary and may also be weighed against the “right” to privacy. If I don’t choose to voluntarily associate/relate to these “new unincorporated states” known as “this state,” I don’t have to. The people’s right to “associate” in “this state” is not prohibited, but it’s not mandatory, either. That right is purely voluntary. If I choose not to voluntarily “associate” myself, they presumably can’t force me—especially if “this state” is, in essence, an implied charitable trust and especially if they seek to involuntarily “associate” me in the status/servitude of fiduciary. This is consistent with those who defend themselves by declaring “I have no relation to this state” or some such.
If you deny the relationship/association, they’ll have to prove it. They can probably come up with some documents and signatures to “prove” that you voluntarily related, but even if they do, they’ll have to overcome your claim that you never voluntarily signed the documents intending to associate as a fiduciary. Insofar as you signed to join a trust, you signed with the intent that you would become a beneficiary rather than a fiduciary. If you didn’t voluntarily assume the servitude of becoming a fiduciary in this implied trust, to hold you to fiduciary obligations would constitute involuntary servitude (which is prohibited within The United States of America). Of course, if you allow yourself to be “addressed” “in the United States,” there is no prohibition under the 13th Amendment against involuntary servitude or even slavery.
Again, the only real freedom anyone has is this: Choose this day who you will serve: God or mammon. The State is most clearly associated with God; this state is absolutely a manifestation of mammon. But the good news is this: We always have the right to choose, each day we can choose. And our choice is finally voluntary. We cannot be “lawfully” forced to serve mammon. Yes, they can put a gun to our heads or jail us etc., and thereby “force” us, but from a legal perspective and especially a spiritual perspective, we cannot be held accountable (at least to God or Satan) for being forced into mammon. We are only liable to God for our CHOICE.]
, and just being there is no charter of incorporation of the new states and just what its duties are, i.e., its intents and purposes, a resulting implied charitable trust is formed by operation of law.
[I get it. It makes perfect sense. If there were a written constitution, there would be an express trust wherein the relative rights and duties of the beneficiaries and fiduciaries were spelled out. Even the names or qualifications required to be a beneficiary or trustee might be spelled out. But because there is no express constitution/indenture, the resulting trust relationship is merely implied and the relative rights and duties are unspecified. We can’t even readily know the requirements for becoming a fiduciary or a beneficiary or who the fiduciaries and beneficiaries are. Result? Rule by man rather than law. Courts of equity where judges rule according to their own conscience rather than law. If it feels good, do it.
As a result of the foregoing, when you go into court, the judge constructs a trust whereby he takes judicial notice [of the presumption that you are a beneficiary of the trust and the presumption is the fact until rebutted with evidence] and invokes unjust enrichment on your part.
[I have speculated for a year or more that the purported “judge” has discretion to “find” (takes notice of) or not find the existence of a private implied trust between the two litigants that is implicitly alleged by plaintiff. (This is a private implied trust between the two litigants, not the “public” implied trust of “this state”. Thus, while I might always be deemed to be fiduciary in relationship to “this state,” I could also be either a beneficiary (plaintiff) or fiduciary (defendant) of a private implied trust.) If the judge “finds” that such private implied trust exists between the two litigants, then he will deem the plaintiff to be the implied beneficiary and the defendant will be the implied fiduciary.
Thus, Senator Harkins might be correct in stating that the court may find that you are a “beneficiary” when you come to court insofar as you come in the capacity of a plaintiff suing a private defendant (not the gov-co). Under these circumstance, the plaintiff can be presumed to be a beneficiary in a private implied trust. Perhaps this explains why Senator Harkins seemingly declared that we are all beneficiaries of the “public trust”.
Alternatively, perhaps all of Harkins statements simply prove that I’m making a fundamental mistake. But I don’t think so.]
Consequently there is no Constitutional Law, only the conscience of the masses in the trust governed by courts of equity whereby all property, real and personal, is held in common to everybody in the trust, i.e., every person re-insures each other’s debts and responsibility, in limited liability.
[Does the “conscience of the masses” imply the collective of a democracy? Is that mass conscience “channeled” by the elected officials (but not the unelected federal judges)?
And I am fascinated (after Terry Self’s conclusion that being “uninsurable” has rendered him a “sovereign”) to see Senator Harkins reference to “every person re-insures each other’s debts . . . .” This implies that “insurance” and limited liability are characteristics of every person in “this state”. Thus, if you have any “insurance” or “limited liability,” you are, by definition, in “this state”. Conversely, does it follow that you must refused to “insure” others or be “insured,” in order to avoid being deemed to be “in this state”?
The requirement for “limited liability” in “this state” is also interesting given that God’s plan is based in part on UN-limited liability (eternal damnation for sinners). Again, we see another sign that “this state” is at least atheistic, probably ungodly, and arguably anti-God and thus Satanic.]
In other words, by operation of law, the people have formed new unincorporated states that operate outside the Constitution under their right to contract and convey their property as a gift in trust, thereby creating relative rights instead of absolute rights.
[B.S. The people have never intended to do any such thing and therefore did not. It is merely “presumed” by the existing “gov-co” that “the people formed new unincorporated states”. You couldn’t find one man in 10,000 who’d even believe that were some “new” states to replace or supplant The States, let alone that “the people” are responsible for this change. Nevertheless, Senator Harkins description of the current “state of affairs” appears to be completely plausible.
But while this “state of affairs” may be presumed by the courts, what would happen if a defendant expressly denied the existence of that “state of affairs”/ “this state”? Would gov-co attempt to overcome that denial by “proving” the existence of “this state”? How would they prove the existence of a “state of affairs” that consists primarily of an “implied trust” that not one man in 10,000 could even imagine, let alone believe in?]
As stated earlier, being there is no charter of incorporation and just what its duties and jurisdiction consist of, this public trust of unincorporated states reverts back to the Articles of Confederation because, under the Articles, taxation and commerce were and are under the control of the states and outside the control of the federal Government.
[“Reverts back to the Articles”??
Congress declared in the Revised Statutes of A.D. 1873 that The Organic Law of The United States of America consists of the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, Northwest Ordinance, and Constitution of the United States. I am still doubtful that any of those four “organic” authorities have been suspended in their entirety, but even if one of them had been suspended, I wouldn’t expect to “revert back” to any other authority since all four are concurrent. That is, all four are in effect every day, so if one were “suspended,” it might be removed as an authority, but we wouldn’t precisely “revert back” to just one of the other three. We’d simply continue to rely on the other three (without whatever amendment was provided by the fourth). The point is semantic, but not insignificant.
At least that’s how I’d’ve interpreted it up until now.
But now that I think about it, I can see how we might’ve (more or less) “reverted” back to the Articles when we lost the money required by the Constitution. So far as I recall, there was no requirement under the Articles that the States of the Union make nothing but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debt.
Thus, if the loss of constitutional money effectively preempted all or part of the Constitution, that loss would not have affected the Northwest Ordinance, Articles of Confederation, or Declaration of Independence (none of which—as I recall—required gold and silver in the States as money).
But even if the States of the Union—as defined in the Constitution—are to some degree diminished by loss of gold/silver/constitutional money, they would still exist under the Articles of the Confederation. The Declaration created the thirteen States. The Articles created the “perpetual Union” of The United States of America. But what is the nature of this perpetual Union? Does it consist of all of the People, or does it consist of the States? I presume that the Articles created a Union of the pre-existing States (which, in themselves, may have consisted of the People).
So, now we’re back to something like US v Belmont to explain the “disappearance” of the States of the Union. The States of the Union must still be here because the Articles created a perpetual Union. The loss of constitutional money may have precluded the States from operating under the Constitution, but it would not eliminate the States nor preclude them from operating under the Articles of Confederation.
There is still much confusion here—at least for me.
But I’m beginning to see that a sensible “sovereign” would study and rely upon the Declaration and the Articles as primary sources of Authority for his claims to liberty. I would still be inclined to rely on the Constitution, but I’d do so as a separate “cause of action”. I.e., sue them under a separate authority for each of 1) the DOI; 2) the Articles; 3) (maybe) the Northwest Ordinance; and 4) the Constitution. Sue under each authority separately from the other two or three. If the Constitution is somehow suspended, fine—let the courts dismiss your causes of action based on the Constitution. But once the Constitutional causes of action are dismissed, how will the courts also dismiss causes of action under the Articles or even the DOI?
And one other point: The Constitution only requires that the States are precluded from declaring anything other than gold or silver coin to be a tender in payment of debt. Thus, while the States might be inhibited from operating under the federal Constitution, the federal government is under no such disability. If the money disappeared, the States might go with it, but the federales would still be operating and unaffected. This might lay the foundation for the States of the Union to revert back to territorial states.
Thus, the loss of constitutional money does not necessarily place the Constitution in abeyance relative to the federal government.
God knows that the gov-co relies mightily on the 14th Amendment for apparent authority to run much of this country. Does Senator Harkins argue that the 14th Amendment (16th? 17th?) Amendments are no longer in effect?
It seems to me that the States of the Union have been impaired, but the federal government has not. This implies that the Constitution is at least partially in effect (relative to the federales). If so, Senator Harkins description of the current “state of affairs” is incomplete and/or mistaken.
It’s interesting to consider the “new” definition of “United States of America” in Blacks 7th & 8th. It declares that this entity is
“A federal republic formed after the War of Independence and made up of the 48 conterminous states, plus the state of Alaska and the District of Columbia in North America, plus the state of Hawaii in the Pacific.”
That definition seemingly points back to the Articles (which created the perpetual Union styled “The United States of America”) but not the Constitution, per se. Is it possible that this definition in Blacks’ 7th & 8th reflect some suspension of the Constitution in the A.D. 1990s? I doubt it.
This whole thing is still a confusion. A mess. I doubt that there is any coherent law to explain the existence of “this state”. I’ll bet that at bottom “this state” is more of a fait accompli’ created under the pretext of emergency and necessity than an entity that exists as a creation of law and public politics. Insofar as “this state” is admitted to be an “implied charitable trust,” it was—by definition—created without express charter, without express law. It is—by definition—unlawful or at best non-constitutional and private.
But insofar as “this state” is private, it is voluntary. Learn how not to volunteer to be a party to that charitable trust, and you’re free.]
Thus, the IR Code is not under control of Congress’ general powers, but rather its authority lies under local law which is state law under the Erie RR doctrine.
[I’ll bet that this “local law” is “this state” law. If the “local law” meant “State of the Union” law, why not just call it “State law”? I’ll bet they use “local law” as code for the law of “this state”.]
The Articles were in force from March 1781 to march 1789. They were never abolished, but discredited by 1786, thus not being incorporated into the Constitution. [Again, the Revised Statutes of A.D. 1873, Congress declared that the DOI, Articles, NW Ordinance, and Constitution were valid and—at that time—comprised “The Organic Law of The United States of America”. Not one of those four documents was declared to be suspended, superseded or otherwise “discredited”. All were recognized as equally valid component of The Organic Law. Thus, insofar as Senator Harkins’ statements suggest that the Article were ever “suspended” or “discredited” is simply false. The Articles were “amended” by the Constitution that made a “more perfect Union,” but they were not revoked or suspended.]
Most authorities of that time agree that had it not been for the Articles of Confederation, our Constitutional Republic would not have survived, but taxation and commerce being under control of the states [of the Union] created major problems as we are witnessing today under local law. Erie held that the law of the state shall apply in the absence of the Constitution or Acts of Congress. First, Erie does not say the incorporated State, but the unincorporated state. Secondly, Erie does not differentiate between foreign or domestic commerce, nor does it differentiate between local or general Acts of Congress. I go ballistic when I hear folks say it’s the incorporated States that are doing us in. Go to your state constitution and check to see if the state boundary lines are there. OH! You say, they are not there. Well then, how can the incorporated State or States be doing us in when there is no boundary lines drawn between the various general powers over the people and the U.S. Supreme Court has stated this many time over. [This paragraph does not read as if it were written by Senator Harkins. This was someone else’s analysis.]
The purpose of the personal income tax is to tax those who want government acting under local law (public policy) to take care of them, which unfortunately is what most of the people want and expect and therein lies the major problem. Anyhow, silence is consent, therefore you are required to file tax returns and share your wealth with the undesirables, that is, unless you use the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC 1602-1611, passed in 1976 in order to offer to those who are dissatisfied with public policy, a statutory remedy to the Constitution under Article III. Your access to the Constitution runs directly through the FSIA in every area in dealing with government, federal, state, or local. [Maybe so, but this paragraph also does not read like the writing of Senator Harkins. I suspect this is something written by someone else. Is “public policy” an insurance “policy”?]
In short, the FSIA codified the era of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1 (1842-1938) whereby a jury trial [not “trial by jury”?] can now be demanded, if desired, in State court on any statutory issue covered by the FSIA against federal, state, or local government. Congress specifically stated that the FSIA must be interpreted by statutory remedy in an Article III court regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff under international law outside of the realm of equity, Erie, Title 42 and other public policy. FSIA also waives sovereign immunity for commercial activities of state and federal governments which consists of about 90% of government activity. In summation, arguing the Internal Revenue Code is an effort in futility.
There are two main categories of resulting trust. In Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No. 2)  Ch. 269, Megarry J. distinguished between automatic and presumed resulting trusts, as follows:
“(a) The first class of case is where the transfer to B is not made on any trust … there is a rebuttable presumption that B holds on resulting trust for A. The question is not one of the automatic consequences of a dispositive failure by A, but one of presumption: the property has been carried to B, and from the absence of consideration and any presumption of advancement B is presumed not only to hold the entire interest on trust, but also to hold the beneficial interest for A absolutely. The presumption thus establishes both that B is to take on trust and also what that trust is. Such resulting trusts may be called “presumed resulting trusts”.
(b) The second class of case is where the transfer to B is made on trusts which leave some or all of the beneficial interest undisposed of. Here B automatically holds on resulting trust for A to the extent that the beneficial interest has not been carried to him or others. The resulting trust here does not depend on any intentions or presumptions, but is the automatic consequence of A’s failure to dispose of what is vested in him. Since ex hypothesis [legal theory] the transfer is on trust, the resulting trust does not establish the trust but merely carries back to A the beneficial interest that has not been disposed of. Such resulting trusts may be called “automatic resulting trusts”.
· LOWE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 163 U.S. 81 (1896) – And, in an information to enforce a charitable trust, a relator is required, who may be compelled, if the information is not maintained, to pay the costs. Attorney General v. Smart, 1 Ves. Sr. 72, and note; Attorney General v. Butler, 123 Mass. 304, 309.
· [This apparently means that if the plaintiff (relator?) makes a charge by means of an “information” that is intended to “enforce a charitable trust,” and the “information” fails (is not proven) then the costs of the trial “may” be imposed on the plaintiff-relator.]