• I received the following email from a reader (I added the bold highlights):
“I recently had an interesting experience in court that I would like to share with you.
“In a nut shell, I gummed up the works with the judge by stating that I was present “in the flesh.” She was literally tossing and turning in her seat, visibly frustrated and was searching for ways to regain control of the situation.
“I believe that the judge was trying to find a way to have me make an appearance in court “in person” or by representing myself (my self?), so that she could administer the trust account.
“I said that I was not representing any artificial persons, that I do not make appearances in court by paper and that I was present “in the flesh.”
“Perhaps by me stating that I was present in the flesh, it had some effect which rendered her unable to proceed.
“If I am the beneficiary of the trust account, am present during a court hearing and state that I am not representing any artificial persons, maybe that eliminates the administrator/executor role and confines the judge to being the trustee.
“Whatever the case, I believe that she had activated a duress alarm and then said “Sir, leave my room now.” I saw the bailiff’s hand motioning for me to come his way. I didn’t want to risk arrest, so I did leave at that time.
“What are your thoughts on this?
- The core of my reply to Jeff follows. However, I’ve added more to my original reply because, the more I think about it, the more I think Jeff may have uncovered something profound:
Trying a new tactic in court is like poking a dead frog leg with a live electrode. You may see the frog leg twitch, but you’ll probably not know exactly why it happened—and the frog sure won’t tell you.
Likewise, you may have said something strange to the judge and she might’ve over-reacted. Maybe the judge is a little goofy.
But odds are, you stumbled onto a “tactic” that the court couldn’t easily deal with. Insofar as you stood you ground and didn’t “cave” when the judge tried to get around your statement that you were there “in the flesh,” it’s evidence that your discovery may be important.
Nevertheless, so far, all we have is an anecdote about a single instance where something surprising happened.
What we need is to see if several others, trying the same tactic in other courts, experience the same result. Then, we’d have some confirmation that your tactics were valid in courts other than that of your particular judge.
We also need a transcript or recording of your conversation with the judge. There’s always a chance that whatever you said that caused the judge to remove you from the court (and seemingly dismiss your case) might be something other than what you remember. You may be attributing your apparent victory to saying “in the flesh” when the judge was actually reacting to something else that you said that you’ve so far overlooked as insignificant.
We “patriots” have victories in court from time to time, but whenever we do, the courts never tell us why we won. We’re left to infer why we won. That’s just the nature of our struggle with the duplicitous court system. Sometimes our inferences are correct, sometimes not.
• In any case, after some consideration, I begin to think that your suspicion that there’s an important difference between “in person” and “in the flesh” may be important.
At first glance, I’d suspect that “in person” typically implicates a fiction.
To say “in person” is incomplete and ambiguous. Maybe, when we consent to appear “in person,” we ought to ask “in what person” am I appearing?
For example, if I went to masquerade dressed up as Batman, in what “person” did I attend? In my own “person”? Or in the “person” of the fictional Batman?
If I agreed that I appeared “in person,” would the courts construe that statement to mean I’m present in my own flesh-and-blood capacity as a natural man? Or, by agreeing to have appeared “in person” or to have made a “personal appearance” (which virtually everyone supposes to mean I appear in my own flesh-and-blood) am I really presumed by the courts to have appeared in the fictional “person” of some other entity?
The question is whether all “persons” are fictions.
I’m about 95% confident that the answer is Yes, but I can’t yet prove that belief.
If all “persons” are fictions, then to appear in court “in person” may mean that the flesh-and-blood man has implicitly agreed to appear in some fictional capacity as some entity other than his natural being. If you agree to appear in a fictional capacity, you have no standing to claim your God-given, unalienable Rights in that fictional capacity. (Fictions are lies. God created no lies. God gives no unalienable rights to fictions/lies).
If appearing “in person” really means “to appear in some ‘person’ other than your natural self,” then appearing “in person,” or to appear in any “personal” capacity might achieve exactly the opposite effect of what most of us would expect.
I.e., we generally assume that making a “personal appearance” or appearing “in person” in court means that we appear in our flesh-and-blood capacity as a “man”. But, what if that assumption were false? What if by appearing “in person” or by making a “personal appearance” we were presumed by the court to have consented to appear in the fictional “person” of someone else?
On the other hand, by specifying that you appeared “in the flesh,” did you refute the court’s presumption of your “personality“?
It may be that the presumption that we each appear as a “person” (as a fiction; as some entity other than our natural selves) in court might be the fundamental presumption on which the court and “this state” bases their authority over us.
Some of us have thought for years that the courts presume that when we appear, we appear as the “representative” of some other fictional entity like “ALFRED N ADASK”.
Would it be more precise and correct to suppose that the courts don’t presume the man “Alfred Adask” to represent the fiction “ALFRED N ADASK,” but instead presume that the man (“Adask”) appears “in the person of” the fiction “ADASK”?
I’m not sure that there’s any significant difference in meaning between appearing to “represent” the fiction “ADASK” (perhaps as “ADASK’s” fiduciary) and appearing “in the person of” the fiction “ADASK”. If there is a difference, that difference may be subtle or even unimportant.
That larger point may be that your statement that you were there “in the flesh” (and therefore, not in any fictional “person”?) may have defeated the court’s primary presumption. If so, you may have stumbled onto one of the most important insights as to how the courts exploit us.
Perhaps, it’s unimportant whether I’m presumed by the courts to “represent” the fictional “ADASK” or presumed to appear “in the person of” the fictional “ADASK”. Perhaps, the most important point is that by declaring myself to appear “in the flesh” I defeat the presumption that I’ve appeared “in the person of” the fiction “ADASK” since that fiction has no flesh. I.e., if I have flesh, I can’t be a fiction. If I claim to appear “in the flesh,” the court cannot maintain the presumption that I’m appearing “in the person of” a fictional entity.
• But, on second thought, suppose I followed your example and also denied that I am fiduciary for or otherwise represent the fictional “ADASK”?
Would I thereby close both “doors” by means of which the court might presume my relationship to the fictional “ADASK” and the court’s jurisdiction over the man “Adask”?
Get that? Maybe there are two ways for the court to presume that the man “Adask” can be tried as “ADASK”:
1) Because the man “Adask” has assented to appear as fiduciary or other representative of the fictional “ADASK”; and,
2) Because the man “Adask” has assented to appear “in the person of” the fictional “ADASK”.
Even though the distinction between those two strategies seems thin, at best, this conjecture makes some sense to me.
I.e., do the courts might have two (more?) bases for presuming that the man “Adask” was entangled with the fictional defendant “ADASK”. Having two separate strategies to create the damning presumption that the man “Adask” could be somehow tried as the fiction “ADASK” is exactly the kind of diabolical brilliance I’ve come to expect from the courts. In the unlikely event that any defendant recognized and expressly denied the presumption that the man “Adask” appeared in court as fiduciary or other representative for the fiction “ADASK,” the court could shift to its “plan B” wherein it presumed that the man “Adask” had assented to appear “in the person of” or “as” the fictional “ADASK”.
But in your case, Jeff, you may have denied both bases for the possible presumption that the man “Jeff” 1) represented; and/or 2) appeared “in the person of” the fictional “JEFF”.
By expressly denying that you appeared in a fiduciary capacity, you seemingly defeated the presumption that your represented the fictional “JEFF”.
But, then, by also declaring that you appeared “in the flesh” you may have refuted the secondary presumption that you appeared “in the person of” the fictional “JEFF”.
The judge bounced you—and the case against you—out of court.
• The previous analysis is only conjecture. My “conclusions” are, for now, merely temporary and subject to change, reversal, or outright rejection.
But I’m intrigued by a couple of implications:
What happens if you’re driving, you’re stopped by a traffic cop, he asks to see your license and you tell him that you don’t need one because: 1) you don’t represent a fiction; and 2) you are driving “in the flesh”?
Odds are, you’ll get your melon thumped and/or spend a night in the slammer.
But what if you could later tell the judge that you’d given the officer notice (maybe on a piece of paper?) that you didn’t represent any fictions and that you were driving “in the flesh”?
Would your traffic ticket be dismissed?
Is it possible that an officer who learns that you don’t represent fictions and are “in the flesh” gives you only a warning rather than a ticket or a good thumping?
What happens if you informed the IRS that 1) you don’t represent fictions and 2) you always appear “in the flesh”?
What would a divorce court do with a “respondent” who informed the court that: 1) he didn’t represent fictions and 2) always appeared “in the flesh”?
Inquiring minds . . . .
In any case, it’s too early to say that any of my conjecture is valid. But I’m going to post the text of your email and my response on my blog and see what my readers think.
In the meantime, the more I think about it, the more I think you may have made a very important discovery.
Thanks very much for sharing your experience.