The following email got me thinking:
Dear Mr. Adask ……………..
I sent the letter to you below back on 22 December 2014 and have been following your emails since then and so far no mention of the issue I presented. Since then I have gone through the Federal District Court System and the Federal Circuit Court System and have identified eleven corrupt members of the judiciary. Now I am preparing a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether a judge who breaks the law is immune from damages liability if in breaking settled law he observes otherwise correct procedural guidelines. I believe the absurdity of that proposition to be absolutely dumbfounding!
So now we will see what the SCT has to say. I entertain no high expectation even though the SCT made it clear in Stump v. Sparkman that judges who perform non-judicial acts shed their immunity!
It’s serious stuff, Mr. Adask. I just hope the book I’m writing about this increasingly screwed up legal system of ours will effect some mid-course correction!
My Letter of 12-22-14 ………………….
We have the most innovative nation in the world! The fact of that matter is a direct function of our having the most effective legal system in the world, a common-law hybrid, if you will.
But that system has an inherent flaw that eventually will render the system we have effete unless addressed and corrected. Unless that happens, we will lose our innovative leadership and with it our economic dominance and this wonderful thing we have will go down the tubes!
The fatal flaw I address is the absolute immunity of the judiciary. I have no quarrel with absolute immunity, but there are exceptions as delineated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Stump v. Sparkman decision, and those exceptions are not being enforced and we as a nation are losing the requisite freedom vital to our innovative leadership and good life!
I recently won a court case (2014.ME.53) the result of which was the forced resignation of the presiding judge who went beyond the pale. Had I been a lawyer, I never would have represented me because there is currently no money in judicial malpractice, and I would not go up against the Bench for the pittance of $150 an hour. I am attempting to change that by suing the judge on a 14th Amendment issue for enough money, that, if I prevail, will hopefully encourage lawyers to pick up the gauntlet on contingency. But the issue needs to be publicized by someone with clout: The public at large is unaware of this festering weakness and its inevitable consequences!
Sincerely …………………… Phil, Ellsworth, Maine.
Your current email is interesting, intriguing. But I have no recollection of receiving the previous letter that you sent last December. That’s not surprising since my memory isn’t as good as it used to be and I sometime receive up to 200 email a day (who can remember all of that?). But the subject of your first letter strikes me as so important, that I’m pretty sure I would remember it–if I’d received it.
I could be wrong, but I don’t believe I received your first letter.
However, I am intrigued by your comments in your most recent email that:
“Now I am preparing a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether a judge who breaks the law is immune from damages liability if in breaking settled law he observes otherwise correct procedural guidelines. I believe the absurdity of that proposition to be absolutely dumbfounding!
“So now we will see what the SCT has to say. I entertain no high expectation even though the SCT made it clear in Stump v. Sparkman that judges who perform non-judicial acts shed their immunity!”
I don’t recall reading Stump vs Sparkman, but based on your text, I have a theory as to why “judges who perform non-judicial acts shed their immunity” but judges who “break the law are immune from damages . . . so long as he observes procedural guidelines.”
I’ve written six previous articles on my blog on the subject of “Administrative Law”.
The cornerstone for those six articles is the “administrative law” article in American Jurisprudence 2nd (AmJur2nd) which tells us repeatedly that the fundamental feature of administrative law is this: Under administrative law, the three fundamental powers of government (legislative, executive and judicial) are all combined under a single authority. Thus, administrative law is contrary to the fundamental concept of “separation of powers”—that the three major powers of government be separated into three separate constitutional “branches”.
I’ve argued that:
1) I am one of the People of The State of Texas;
2) I’m therefore a beneficiary of the express, charitable trust called “The Constitution of The State of Texas”;
3) one of those “benefits” is “Division of Powers” as per Article 2 of the Texas Constitution;
4) administrative law violates the concept of separation of powers; and therefore,
5) I refuse to consent to being deprived of the loss of my right to a judicial trial and being instead subjected to administrative law or an administrative court; and
6) I will happily appear in any Article 5 (Texas Constitution) judicial court.
I’ve presented that argument in a previous court case and the government did stop prosecuting, although I thought that stop was based on other reasons.
But your email makes me realize that, if my notions about administrative law are correct, we can only be dragged into an administrative court with our express or implied consent. If so, being subject to administrative law is a voluntary act. We can each say Yes, or perhaps No, depending on our personal preference.
If the previous speculation were true, a truly “Judicial” court would seem to act only under the “judicial” branch of your State or national government. The “Judicial” court would be completely separate from the legislature and executive branches. But, because administrative law acts as a combination of legislative, executive and judicial powers, an administrative court is not a true, “judicial” court. If so, whenever a judge committed a non-judicial act (and that would theoretically include operating an administrative court), the judge would be liable for damages–unless the injured party had voluntarily assented to participate in the non-judicial (administrative) court process.
If this theory were true, it would follow that a defendant who didn’t expressly object to being tried, prosecuted, or “adjudicated” in an administrative tribunal would be presumed to have consented to be tried in that administrative (non-judicial) forum. If the defendant consented to a non-judicial trial, he might have no grounds to complain of the judge’s conduct unless the judge violated the rules of administrative procedure.
If this line of speculation were valid, it might even follow that “administrative law” is some sort of private law wherein the administrative court’s jurisdiction in each case depended on the personal “consent” of each defendant.
That “consent” might not necessarily be expressly declared at the onset of each administrative court hearing. For example, did the defendant have a drivers license? By virtue of such drivers license did the defendant agree to bound by the (private?) “rules of the road” rather than the constitutional “law of the land”
Who owns the “road”? Is it owned by the People or by some private entity? Who sets the rules for the “road”? We the People or some private trust which owns legal title to the “road”?
If the “road” is owned by some private entity and the defendant has a drivers license, can he thereby be presumed to have consented to be tried in a (private?) administrative process?
What about use of a vehicle registration on the defendant’s car or a license plate? What about use of a Social Security number or a bank signature card? How ‘bout use of credit cards, debit cards or even public (private?) utilities? How ‘bout use of (private?) Federal Reserve Notes rather than constitutional money? What about a concealed-carry permit?
Could any or all of these licenses, applications or pledges be construed as evidence that you’ve consented to be subject to the decisions of an administrative, non-judicial court rather than constitutional, judicial court?
Could this explain why some state governments are eager to give drivers licenses to illegal aliens? Could it be that the illegals aren’t subject to administrative law unless they’ve expressed some kind of consent by taking a drivers license or some such? Could it be that Obama’s proposed amnesty-for-illegal-aliens program is really intended less to provide illegals with “amnesty”? Or is this “amnesty” really a device to ensure that illegals can be presumed to be subject to government’s administrative law and administrative courts?
Most of what modern government does is now “administrative”. Does the modern concept of “procedural due process” flow from the 14th Amendment? Or does “substantive due process” flow from judicial courts and the constitutional principle of separation of powers, while “procedural due process” flows from, and is required in our non-judicial, administrative courts?
Is the immunity for judges that based on following “procedural guidelines” applicable only to judges who don’t act in a “judicial” capacity (and therefore have no “judicial immunity”), but instead are acting in the non-judicial capacity in an administrative court?
Could it be that the “absurdity” you complained of (that judges lose their judicial immunity when they perform a non-judicial act; but maintain some other kind of immunity so long as their acts are procedurally correct) be the result of two different forums rather than a contradiction? I.e., the judge acting judicially in a judicial court will enjoy judicial immunity unless he acts in a non-judicial manner.
But a judge acting in a non-judicial court (such as administrative court?) will maintain a non-judicial, procedural immunity so long he doesn’t violate the “procedural due process” rules of administrative law?
Does the judge enjoy one kind of immunity (judicial) when he’s in a judicial court and a second kind of immunity (procedural) when he’s in a non-judicial (presumably, administrative) court? If so, the two kinds of immunity you complained of may not be truly contradictory.
Again, all of this is conjectural. More, it’s only a theory that I’ve conjured up in the last few minutes. It’s not be relied on.
• Even so, this theory really rings my bell. To me, and for the moment, it sounds plausible and potentially important.
I.e., if the theory I’m proposing here turned out to be roughly correct, it might open the door to avoiding 90% or more of the non-judicial, administrative process that government routinely uses to assault us–supposedly with our consent.
I think we might have lift-off, here.
• I’ll read Stump vs Sparkman to confirm that judges acting in a non-judicial capacity can lose their judicial immunity. That makes perfect sense, of course. “Judicial” immunity must be available only to those judges who act in a “judicial” capacity. If there’s an immunity for judges who act in a non-judicial capacity (like operating an administrative court), that immunity might be based on a non-judicial source such as the private consent of the defendant to “voluntarily” subject himself to administrative law.
I get that.
But I don’t yet understand whichever authority you’re relying on to support your claim that a “judge who breaks the law is immune from damages liability if in breaking settled law he observes otherwise correct procedural guidelines.”
I would very much like to see whatever cite, authority, opinion, etc. justifies your claim that judges who merely follow procedure are immune from damages caused by their own unlawful acts. CAN YOU SUPPLY?
I look forward to hearing from you.